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The death squads of J&K

The May 14 suicide attack by the fidayeen [suicide squads] was directed at a civilian target in Jammu. It replicated the previous attack against a soft target at the Raghunath Temple on March 30 this year. The victims were Hindus and the purpose was to create panic and break the economy of Jammu, which thrives on the seven million Hindu pilgrims who annually visit Vaishno Devi.

The fidayeen introduced the suicide attacks in J&K to coincide with the Kargil misadventure. In mid-1999 army units were moved from the valley to the Kargil sector for Operation Vijay, resulting in temporary disruption of the counterinsurgency grid in the valley. Hoping to exploit the resultant voids in deployment, terrorist groups decided to raise the ante by seeking direct confrontation with security forces through sneak attacks on their posts and camps.

The idea was to gain moral ascendancy, force security forces to deploy additional troops on protective duties and thereby degrade their potential to carry out offensive operations against terrorists, and attract media attention. They succeeded remarkably initially.

The first suicide attack was launched on August 6, 1999, by the fidayeen on a Rashtriya Rifles post at Chak Natnus in Kupwara district. Five army personnel and six terrorists were killed. This operation was carried out by terrorists belonging to the Hizbul Mujahideen.

Subsequently there have been 41 more suicide [42 if you include the May 19 incident at Udhampur] attacks in J&K till this day. These include attacks on high-value targets like the corps headquarters in Badami Bagh, Srinagar, and the brigade headquarters in the valley.

Two attempts were made at the Srinagar airport: one broke the perimeter and the other rammed through the checkpost. Both failed. The animal bomber was also tried out. A mule strapped with explosives was pushed into a security post and detonated by remote control, causing damage and casualties.

The pattern of fidayeen attacks is to storm, strike and die or escape. After Musharraf's January 12 speech renouncing terrorism, fidayeen attacks had declined dramatically, from nine in the first four months of 2001 to three this year -- till May 14, probably disconnected from American Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Christina Rocca's visit.

It is believed that the Inter Services Intelligence has set new guidelines for the fidayeen. It has left it up to them to plan and launch their attacks wherever and whenever. There is a general shortage of volunteers for the fidayeen squads. Unlike the LTTE and Middle East suicide groups, it has no females. In fact, their attack is not a one-way mission as many have managed to get away. Neither does it believe in instant martyrdom. Their target has always been the military except in the last two incidents in Jammu where the victims were mainly civilians, including families of security force personnel.

The fidayeen has succeeded in forcing entry into security force posts as many as 37 times and used cars or vehicle bombs on four occasions. Conspicuously, the human bomber has not been used as yet.

During these attacks in as many as 15 cases, all terrorists were killed by the security forces. In the bulk of the attacks -- about 20 or more -- some were killed while a few escaped. It was only in six cases that all fidayeen managed to escape and in two instances they failed to inflict any casualties.

They have accounted for the killing of nearly 200 security personnel and have lost 85 fidayeen. More than 50 per cent of the attacks were staged last year, while 85 per cent of all attacks occurred in the Srinagar valley. The others took place in Poonch, Doda and Jammu. Nearly 35 of the attacks have been shared between the Lashkar-e-Tayiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed while only a handful have been claimed by the Hizbul Mujahideen.

The 'success ratio' of a human bomber vis-a-vis the fidayeen is five to six times higher. The human bomber can cause mayhem and huge casualties in an instant as we have witnessed in Sri Lanka and the Middle East. The Al Aqsa and Fatah Martyrs Brigade carried out an unprecedented seven suicide attacks in seven days and more last month, resulting in nearly 200 dead and 300 injured.

Till the end of 2001, the LTTE had carried out 173 suicide attacks -- nearly 80 per cent of them successful. The last attack carried out by them was at the Colombo airport in July 2001.

The only way the fidayeen can be stopped or deterred is by reducing their life span and blocking escape routes. They have to be provided instant martyrdom, but that is easier said than done. Ideally the fidayeen has to be intercepted before he can reach his intended target, preferably at source. This requires intelligence of a very high order, which is a tall order for the Indian security system.

In the meantime, security forces have to tighten their perimeter defences and security and use sharpshooters to despatch the fidayeen by the shortest route to heaven.

India should not be provoked by the fidayeen into impetuous reaction. The suicide attacks are designed to create panic and divert troops from the border to the hinterland. Our response, at a time and place of our choosing, must be carefully thought through.

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Major General (retd) Ashok K Mehta