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The media should leave the Army alone

In his first meeting with journalists, the very articulate new Chief of Army Staff, General S Padmanabhan (Paddy) listed his operational priorities and service concerns. There was no pathbreaking disclosure. But he made known his intention to train the Army also for nuclear war.

In an earlier interview with this writer, the COAS made the same point. And he emphasised that his remarks on nuclear war should not be made a banner headline. That is precisely what one English daily in Delhi and several Pakistani newspapers have done. Even General Pervez Musharraf is reported to have noticed the new army chief's comments on nuclear war.

Another disturbing trend about news reporting is attributing sensitive remarks to unnamed persons. Take the most recent from a 'news service': "'Never has the Army taken so much flak in the past, and probably, except the 1962 debacle, seldom has its morale been lower,' a senior officer at army headquarters said." Similar comments on command failure, resentment among jawans and junior officers with their seniors and unfitness of the Army for counterinsurgency operations have also been attributed to service officers and 'sources' which have remained anonymous. Army bashing including COAS-bashing by some sections of the media is a Kargil and post-Kargil phenomenon. The intensity of the attacks and the mild ripostes are unprecedented.

So scathing and personal were the media attacks that General Ved Prakash Malik was forced to admit that while the Army may have won the war on the ground, they lost the information war. At one stage he even considered resigning. This is a pity. He's only the second COAS after Sam Maneckshaw who took the Army to victory. One can quibble about so many things during Kargil, but not its end result. The war between Malik and the media has not ended as complaints filed with the Press Council of India and courts have still to be settled.

The purpose of this article is to point out that most of the adverse comments made in the media about the chain of command, generalship and morale in the Army are hastily configured. They betray insufficient knowledge of the ethos and functioning of the Army. Unfortunately, some retired generals who spend more time on the seminar circuit than in keeping in touch with the jawans have lent credibility to these reports.

Without going into the micro picture of the fitness of the Army, the ultimate test of any fighting force is its capacity to wage and win a war or border skirmish -- the 1971 military victory against Pakistan, the Sumdorong Chu encounter with the PLA in 1986 and now, the Kargil war. No wars like Kargil and 1971 can be won decisively without able generalship, high morale, higher direction of war and fusing defence with diplomacy. Equally, no war can be won without the daring of junior leaders and the fighting spirit of its soldiers. In the Army, this tonic is known as regimental spirit which nurtures high morale.

Thus the comment in the news service about the Army morale being low and the attribution to a senior officer is ill-founded and mischievous. Of course the Army has its difficulties. But never in recent times has its morale been higher than after Kargil. If this were not so, its unending involvement in the proxy war and counterinsurgency and the heavy loss of life would have made it wilt and wither away. The fact that a 1.2 million volunteer Army is holding forth -- and cheerfully -- is cause for satisfaction, not mindless speculation.

Look at these indicators of high morale. The Army has been fighting the new phase of post-Kargil proxy war against the Fedayeen without any let-up in their discipline, morale and human rights record. In the last two years it has suffered nearly 700 casualties in J&K alone, but it has felled nearly three times that number of militants. Three years ago, there were cases of soldiers shooting their officers. Not any more. It is temerity, not timidity, that shows in the ranks. Young officers have to be restrained from taking too many risks.

Many units have won gallantry awards that equal in operational performance, the heroics of Tololing and Tiger Hill. 16 Dogras has created a J&K record by bagging two Kirti Chakras, three Shaurya Chakras, seven Sena Medals, three Mention in Despatches and 16 COAS Commendation Cards. Naturally there is a price the army is paying: conflict fatigue and slack in vigil. IEDs and Fedayeen attacks are on the rise. Increased deployment and enhanced tenures have cut down training time and peace tenures -- some units have been pushed back into the proxy war . Leave and R and R (Rest and Recuperation) are essential for maintaining morale. It is high time the Northern Command set up R and R camps on the lines it has induction training camps.

The Sri Lankan Army is locked since 1990 in a high intensity war with the LTTE. They've recently been through a bad patch: high casualties, low success, increasing desertions, decreasing recruitments and hardly any turnover of troops, resulting in low morale and inadequate leadership. These are symptoms of a failing Army. None of these deficiencies, thank god, has afflicted ours though the shortage of 13,000 officers can no longer be ignored.

These are difficult times for an Army that is no longer a holy cow. It is under severe media scrutiny. Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh's recent book In the Line of Duty on the 1965 war has reopened old wounds. Officers and units have been named for dereliction of duty which included cowardice, the guilty were removed from command and one unit disbanded. Even in 1971, Maneckshaw would give a mouthful to erring generals, and commanders who were not pulling their weight were relieved of command without media fanfare.

The six officers and men pulled up for failures at Kargil are being investigated under the Army law. These figures are nowhere near the numbers reported in the media. Even units which have been decorated for gallantry have been erroneously mentioned as ones being investigated.

The Army made the mistake of not appointing an independent Kargil enquiry from outside the Northern Command, headed by an Army Commander. It would have lent credibility to the disciplining of a handful of offenders. One should remember that no one goes scot-free in the Army, though the penalty at senior rank is not discernible. As for the fitness and state of the morale of the Army, it is high -- not low -- and could be still higher if the media left it alone for a while.

General Ashok K Mehta