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The structure of the National Security Council is full of holes

After a sustained barrage of fire on the National Security Council, which he called at the time of its birth last year a 'dead mouse from a labour of love,' doyen of defence analysis and journalism K Subrahmanyam seemed to have made his peace with the stillborn National Security Council.

The pungent press campaign about the deficiencies in the National Security Council, including an attack on the prime minister and his national security advisors, were so many labours of Sisyphus.

That is how it looked at the end of a two-day seminar recently at the prestigious united services institution, on what ails the National Security Council and how to revive it.

The seminar ended without any diagnostic prescription. Also allowed to subside was the call for an independent national security advisor, not doubling as principal secretary to the prime minister. In this case, Brajesh Mishra, not to be outdone, went public earlier justifying his holding both the posts.

The National Security Council was established on April 16, 1999 by a gazette notification as an advisory council on futuristic national security planning.

The united services institution seminar produced three views: continuing with the existing National Security Council structures with cosmetic changes, overhauling it and simply scrapping it. What it also revealed was the high levels of ignorance even among redoubtable panelists on the existing structures and processes in the National Security Council establishment.

A serving bureaucrat and key functionary of the National Security Council secretariat became the first instance of an official incumbent revealing routine information which turned out to be the high point of the annual national security seminar. He was the lone defender of the functioning of the National Security Council.

Yet, the present National Security Council structure which consists of the NSC, national security advisor, strategic planning group, national security advisory board, and the national security council secretariat, are full of holes principally because these are dual-tasked.

The National Security Council replicates the cabinet committee on security and has never met. The national security advisor is also the principal secretary to the prime minister whereas the appointment deserves a full-time security expert. The strategic planning group is in effect a committee of 16 secretaries, and the service chiefs, chaired by the cabinet secretary and has neither the time nor the wherewithal for strategic planning.

Members of the national security advisory board are honorary, outside government and string as professionals in think-tanks and newspapers. The National Security Council secretariat is also the joint intelligence committee. It is required to service the National Security Council, various task forces, groups of ministers, national security advisory board, strategic planning group and whoever else calls on their expertise. One thing they don't do is analyse intelligence which is their raison d'etre.

The non-performing units of the National Security Council establishment are the NSC which has never met and the strategic planning group which is reported to have met thrice. It is the national security advisory board which has won laurels and produced two valuable documents: the draft nuclear doctrine and the strategic defence review.

In its effort to be a consensual document, the draft nuclear doctrine transgressed its charter. Instead of being a home-grown minimum nuclear doctrine, it spiralled into a freewheeling essay maximising nuclear capability and was, at the time, disowned by the government.

The strategic defence review, on the other hand, was kept under wraps on the advice of the national security advisory board. Even the executive summary was not made public. These two documents are being reviewed by the strategic planning group, relevant ministries and will be presented hopefully to the National Security Council, for ultimate sanction of the government (read cabinet committee on security).

The Kargil review committee report and the resultant findings of the four task forces set up for national security and military reform are being reviewed by a group of ministers which is de facto the cabinet committee on security minus the prime minister. They were to forward their summary of recommendations by November 16 but have sought three additional weeks to get their act together.

They held their 15th meeting on November 25 to consider the recommendations of the last two task forces on defence management and intelligence. This means that papers on Kargil and national security will be tabled only in the Budget session of Parliament next year.

Incidentally, the group of ministers is considering the separation of the post of national security advisor from that of principal secretary to prime minister. Unfortunately the entire debate on national security has got confined to the post of the national security advisor whereas the real need is for the review of the old and new national security structures, posts and processes. For example, there is requirement for redefinition of their charter, expansion of the National Security Council secretariat, greater transparency and assured accessibility of service chiefs to the National Security Council/cabinet committee on security.

The national security advisor is a beacon for defence and security strategy. Not for nothing does he command and oversee every national security structure and system like the strategic planning group, national security advisory board, crisis management group and National Security Council secretariat. He and his teams have to provide the National Security Council and cabinet committee on security with the best range of options for optimum decision-making, no mater how deformed the NSC, which is better than not having one.

For the first time after Independence, the government is on the threshold of ordering sweeping changes in defence and national security like placing the Indo-Tibetan Border Police force under operational command of the army along the LAC opposite Tibet.

General Ashok K Mehta