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The Rediff Special/ S Gopikrishna

Veerappan & Co: Divide and fool

Who says old tricks work just once?

In the 18th century, Robert Clive's incisive insight into the Indian psyche became the bedrock of all British conquests -- the policy of divide and conquer.

Two-and-a-half centuries later, a variant of the same technique has become the hallmark of Koose Munusami Veerappan, sandalwood smuggler-cum-brazen brigand-cum-plain scum.

Veerappan, following the usual pattern of maneuvering by brigands, wields the reins because of his assiduous and artful pitting of the Tamil Nadu and Karnataka governments against each other, both of which seem content to play the fool.

He divides and rules, rather divides and fools.

You may ask whether there exists a usual pattern of maneuvering by brigands? Is there a standard template to how state governments can be taken a for a ride?

Of course, there is!

What makes Veerappan thrive is the very phenomenon that sustained half a dozen other brigands -- eg: Phoolan Devi, Dara Singh, Kamdeo Singh and Naxalites of various hues and colours.

What does a brigand have to do in order to thrive?

He or she has to select an area of operation that: Lies on the border of two adjoining states
Is covered by lush forests or mountains
Is economically depressed
Suffers from governmental apathy and the lordly disdain encountered in the lower to middle levels of the bureaucracy.

The first two conditions are enough to make any brigand's day. The third is a bonus and the existence of the fourth results in the brigand becoming an unvanquished, if uncrowned, king.

Any brigand operating in the twilight zone -- the area at the very border of two neighbouring states realises that it would take the combined forces of two states to hunt him down. The probability of the police forces combining to hunt a common foe is no different than the Pakistani government's tendency to meddle in Kashmir.

When things become hot in a given state, all that the thug has to do to protect himself is to cross the state border and bide his time until things cool down. In the very unlikely chance that inter-state police co-operation could be secured, resulting in the police of the second state giving him a chase, the brigand simply has to re-enter the state border and voila -- we are back to square one!

Of course, while living in the neighbouring state, the brigand can always apply himself to his trade, assuring himself of a steady income and preventing his skills from atrophy.

Sound implausible?

Well, let us start with the 'Mecca' of brigands -- the Chambal valley in northern Madhya Pradesh and the southern part of central Uttar Pradesh. The dacoits of the Chambal valley, who have reigned supreme in this area read like a 'Who's Who of Criminals in India,' starting from the legendary Man Singh and Putlibai all the way to Phoolan Devi.

When the MP police actually got around to taking action, the standard modus operandi of the dacoits was to cross the state border and take refuge in UP. If the MP police -- ultimately overcame its disdain for co-operation and agreed to help the UP police, whose overcoming their own lordly attitude is no mean feat -- weeks, if not months would have been wasted. The dacoit in question would have had all the time to start fresh operations from his new base in UP.

If a few illiterate villagers-turned-gangsters can survive through the nimble manoeuvre of jumping across the state border, think of the havoc wrought by more educated and sophisticated heads.

The Naxalites, consisting of educated and intelligent youth who been trained in guerrilla warfare, have used the same strategy to diversify and expand their organisation to half a dozen states with the speed that would make most multinational corporations turn green with envy.

Andhra Pradesh and Orissa in the '70s, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra in the '80s, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh in the '90s, it's a long list...

As to why the Government of India lets inter-state police rivalry overshadow pursuit of a common enemy remains a perpetual mystery. Firstly, it is deaf to the utterances of police officers such as SP Rajendra Chaturvedi of the Madhya Pradesh cadre, who played a pivotal role in the surrender of Phoolan Devi. In an open reference to the then existing inter-state rivalry, he declared: "One of my fears was that she would surrender to the UP police."

It is an open secret that the MP police outbid the UP police in dangling carrots in order to make Phoolan Devi surrender to them alone. Brigands, obviously, have the luxury of surrendering on their own terms.

Secondly, the government is satisfied that some policy existing in some obscure manual suffices to address inter-state administrative rivalry. Not surprisingly, the policy is as effective as the GOI's efforts to limit the population.

The problem of inter-state co-operation is further accentuated by the presence of forests and hills in the area of operation. Difficult to penetrate even in the best of conditions, the terrain becomes positively hostile while looking for ground support and reinforcements.

One cannot but point out that Dara Singh (the prime accused in the murder of Graham Staines) evaded the police net for a whole year as a result of his familiarity with the forests in the Baripada area.

In addition to the aforementioned reasons, the tendency of the local administration to emulate a bull in a china shop when dealing with the inhabitants of the brigands' haunts, has resulted in the virtual facilitation of a 'jungle mein mangal' for each and every bandit.

Livelihood in heavily forested and hilly areas is synonymous with eking out a precarious existence and just making ends meet. The paucity of resources in the area forces the residents to resort to hunting, wood-cutting and simplified forms of agriculture that are not exactly fashionable in the eyes of government officials coming from outside the area.

Patronising at best and stridently aggressive at worst, officials in the local administration implement unwieldy rules. The rules are equivalent to making the local inhabitants (who find survival complicated and challenging even in the best of conditions) jump from the frying pan into the fire.

The resulting interaction and misunderstandings end in apathy and worse, exploitation of the locals -- a veritable spectrum ranging all the way from underpayment for back-breaking labour to sexual exploitation. Such behaviour only alienates the locals and exhorts them to welcome anybody in conflict with law enforcement agencies as a god-sent saviour.

As an example, examine the roots of the making of Veerappan:

Concocting some hare-brained scheme to regulate the cutting down of sandalwood trees by some officials who probably can't distinguish between a sandalwood tree and an eucalyptus tree. Not surprisingly, the local villagers have always welcomed Veerappan, and the Naxalites before him, with open arms.

Smugglers who come in the search of business, gain the sympathy of the locals and end up running their own administration, emulating the feat of Robert Clive.

At the height of the smuggler king Kamdeo Singh's raj in north-western Bihar in the 1980s, hatred for government officials was so evident that they fled whenever his standard insignia of a red coloured gamcha (cloth) draped around a lathi was visible. Indeed, outlaws levying and extracting taxes from the law is not an impossible phenomenon.

What can be done to contain the malaise?

It is necessary to reiterate the old cliché about sensitising the police to the needs of the residents in a brigand's area of operation. Unless there exists a significant level of understanding about the habits and beliefs of the local population, more and more Veerappans and Dara Singhs will sprout and flourish.

Once the support of the local population is secured and access to local support cut off, the brigands and thugs running amuck in India will face the fate that befalls sharks in an ocean drained of water. If only the states joined hands and operated with more subtlety would an effective solution to banditry be found. Else, we have to continue playing the fool while the brigands rule.

S Gopikrishna writes from Toronto on topics of pertinence to India and Indians. He welcomes feedback and can be reached at gopikrsnas@mailcity.com

In addition, he also requests that opinions about his articles sent to Rediff.com be forwarded to the above e-mail address.

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