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The charm of the Russian connection has gone forever

Part I: The Russian connection

The Indian Navy has gained immensely from the Russian connection over the past 35 years. During this period it has received patrol boats, destroyers, minesweepers, missile boats, missile vessels, submarines, maritime patrol aircraft and ASW helicopters from the undivided Soviet Union at less than one fifth of the price it would have cost to equip itself from Western sources.

Furthermore, the payments had not only to be made in rupee terms but were spread over fifteen years. No wonder we are still repaying this largesse at the old exchange rate of ten rupees per rouble even when one can easily get more than a hundred rouble for the rupee!

The Russia connection changed the very ethos and the structure of the Navy. A large number of officers and sailors had to be deputed to the Soviet Union to train for and take over the ships and submarines. The Navy had two choices. It could either deal with the Soviets through interpreters like the Indonesians did, or its personnel could begin learning Russian.

Sensing that the connection would be a long one, the Navy wisely chose the second option. Over the years a large number of officers and sailors have become quite fluent in Russian, making them quite at home in Moscow and Leningrad. One inadvertent fallout of this added skill was that in addition to English it became a common language of conversation between crews manning Russian ships, one especially valuable during the 1971 war.

During the missile attack on Karachi in 1971 it was used extensively for communications between the boats. When Pakistani warships intercepted Indian communications, not only did they not know what the Indians were talking about but subsequently accused the Russians of running Indian ships.

The Soviets enforced strict security restrictions on their ships and equipment. Only those required to man or repair these ships were to be entrusted with access and certain technical knowledge. The Indian Navy had to acquiesce to these restrictions. Western ships and personnel were not allowed to visit Vishakhapatnam, which was developed, into a major naval base with Soviet assistance.

A large number of Soviet 'guarantee specialists' were deputed to India to look after the defects in Soviet ships. Of course, they were not allowed to visit India's western acquisitions. This type of security restriction was not unusual.

The Germans imposed similar restrictions during the construction of HDW submarines at Mazagon Dock. Ironically, the Germans had no compunction in passing off the Indian submarine designs to the South Africans!

Soviet acquisitions also divided the Navy into three distinct camps. Most of those who had been trained to man Russian ships and who had visited the Soviet Union inevitably developed a soft corner for that country. On the other hand those who had been trained on western equipment continued to extol the virtues and sophistication of that hardware. They never forgave the Navy for taking away their frequent trips 'back home' and lost no opportunity in criticising Soviet ships and submarines.

A minuscule few in the middle treated each country and its ships and equipment on merit. It is not surprising that even many chiefs of naval staff became a party to this division and its prejudices. Over the years these sharp divisions have disappeared, mainly because Indian designed vessels of the Godavari, Khukri and Delhi class have both western and Russian equipment on board.

The Soviets were generous with their equipment but not with their knowledge. Unlike the west, they passed on no tactical doctrines or methods of exploiting their ships. It is to the credit on the Indian Navy that they not only learned to man and run Soviet ships effectively but also superimposed on them western doctrines in tactical matters. They also did not take the Soviets at their word but innovated in many ways.

Despite being a modern naval power the Soviets were ages behind times in many tactical aspects. They had no method of replenishing their ships alongside another. The Indian Navy adapted their knowledge in this area to Soviet ships. The missile attack on Karachi in 1971 would never have been possible had the Indian Navy not decided to increase the range of the boats by having them towed by bigger ships. The attack came as a shock even to the Soviets.

The Indian Navy's greatest achievement in the past three decades, one, which has gone mostly unnoticed, is the smooth induction of Soviet ships in its fleet. The Navy went through very difficult times, especially in the initial years. Its officers and men went through hardships, braved extremes of weather in inhospitable terrain, learned not only new skills but how to stand up to Soviet bullying. But eventually both sides developed mutual respect for each other.

The relations were far smoother in the '80s than they were at the start. Recently there has been some unfair criticism of Soviet acquisitions from the Comptroller and Auditor General and some uninformed reporters. The purchase of the 877 EKM (Kilo class) submarine has been severely criticised. The critics are totally unaware of the environment in the '80s when the submarine was purchased.

To start with, the Cold War was at its height. US President Ronald Reagan was calling the Soviet Union the 'evil empire.' Western arms dealers were willing to sell ships and equipment but at prohibitive prices and without credit. To a dollar starved country there was little choice but to go for Soviet equipment.

The Soviets have been building submarines for over 70 years. The Soviet submarines had no doubt certain deficiencies. They were noisier than their western counterparts. The Soviets subs also did not have good batteries that necessitated frequent charging. Furthermore, the Soviet submarines were essentially designed for operations in the cold waters of North Atlantic. The air conditioning capacity was not sufficient for operations in tropical waters.

The Indian side knew these deficiencies. They also knew how to overcome them. The battery problem was eliminated when the far superior Swedish technology batteries developed by Standard Batteries of Mumbai replaced the Soviet batteries. (The batteries have since been exported to Iran and Algeria who too have bought Kilos).

The air conditioning problem also could be minimised by strict AC discipline on board. The Soviets themselves had eliminated the noise problem by making the Kilo a very silent submarine and an excellent weapon platform. The United States Navy in its periodic evaluation has given the Kilo very high marks.

Ironically, as late as 1995 the Chinese purchased four Kilos from Russia. Obviously they had not read the report of the CAG babus. The clinching point is the price of the Kilos, an astonishing Rs 100 crore per boat. The initial contract for six boats was signed in 1976. Astonishingly, when the Soviets offered a further two boats in 1988 they offered them at the same initial price, when the price of a similar vessel in the west was about Rs 700 crore.

In 1992, Pakistan signed a contract for three Agusta type submarines with the French for $ 1 billion (Rs 1,000 crore) per boat at the time and a cool Rs 1,500 crore at present. To criticise the purchase of the Kilos is like censuring all those poor Indians for purchasing the gas-guzzling Fiats and the rattling Ambassadors in the '70s and '80s.

Although India's Russia connection exists even today, things changed in the late '80s. The introduction of perestroika during the Gorbachov regime and the break-up of the Soviet Union into 15 republics changed forever the cozy relationship that existed until then.

Russia's change over to a market economy resulted in an end to the artificial political prices and the credit. From now on the Soviets began to quote more realistic prices, although even now they are lower than those quoted in the West. They also wanted payment in dollar cash down.

The Indian Navy will be paying some Rs 4,500 crore for three Russian frigates and two submarines, according to a contract signed in 1997. This is more than the total we have paid for all the ships in the past thirty years. If we purchase the aircraft carrier Gorshkov, we will have to pay about Rs 2,000 crore to refit the carrier and another Rs 3,000 crore to buy its complement of aircraft. The charm of the Russian connection has gone forever.

Admiral J G Nadkarni (retd), former chief of the naval staff, is a frequent contributor to these pages.

Admiral J G Nadkarni (retd)