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India's forces must join or perish

If ever the Indian government decides to intervene in Sri Lanka, militarily or to render 'humanitarian assistance', it will have to be a joint operation involving the three services, just as in 1987-90. Very few operations today, which involve the military, are single service events.

Jointmanship has obviously been on the minds of our armed forces recently. A few months ago when the army chief visited the Defence Services Staff College, he pleaded for greater integration in operations by the services. This was wrongly reported by the media as a pitch for integrating the services.

More recently, the three service chiefs and the defence minister held a conclave, called Brahmastra for some strange reasons, at Chandigarh. Jointmanship was believed to have been the main point of discussion at the meeting.

Joint operations by a country's armed forces are, of course, nothing new. The idea reached its pinnacle during the Second World War. The massive landings on the Normandy beaches on June 6, 1944 were a triumph of, not only inter-service co-operation, but also between the allies.

Operation Desert Fox of 1990 and Operation Desert Storm, which followed, were perfect examples of how all elements -- land, air and sea -- have to integrate perfectly for the success of any military operation. The importance of jointmanship has been realised by India's armed forces.

In most operations since independence, the army and air force have worked together and the navy has joined in whenever its services were required. Our triumph in 1971 was in no small measure due to the fact that all service headquarters were in New Delhi. The three service chiefs were able to meet daily and dovetail operational plans into each other's.

On the other hand, the military headquarters of Pakistan's armed forces were dispersed and each service fought its war.

Despite this background, jointmanship has a long way to go in India's armed forces. It may exist to a certain degree in New Delhi, but it does not extend to the theatre level. The country does not have a single joint command or an operational theatre commander.

If we have a war in the west, for example, the Army Commander will be in Pune, the Naval Commander in Mumbai and Air Force Commander in Ahmedabad.

The same is the case with other areas. In 21st century India, no two military commanders are in the same location. A sort of joint command exists in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, but even here the Air Force unit, which is some distance away from the Army and Navy headquarters, takes its orders directly from the Air Headquarters in New Delhi.

True jointmanship, of course, does not mean only joint operational commands. It extends to many other aspects. It also means a fully integrated joint budget, a joint staff at all levels and joint training at various levels. Most of these do not exist in India.

Jointmanship in India exists to the extent of the three chiefs routinely being photographed backslapping each other, but not much more beyond that. The reasons why jointmanship has not and cannot make much progress are historical and political.

Since ancient times there have been armies in India. The Moghuls and the Marathas had invincible armies. The British allowed the Indian Army to grow to mammoth proportions during the World Wars.

On the other hand, India's seaward defences were underwritten by the Royal Navy and the Indian Navy was never allowed to grow to anything more than a coastal force. At the time of independence, the naval budget was only three per cent of the defence budget. The same was more or less the case with the Indian Air Force.

Even today, the strengths of the three Services in India are lopsided. The Army is 20 times the size of the Indian Navy and 10 times the size of the Air Force. The first priority of the Air Force and Navy and their chiefs in India is to maintain their identities.

With a background of a thousand years, Indians are only aware of India's Army and the soldier. Most have never heard of the other two Services, leave alone their contribution in any conflict. In Punjab, for example, there are Jarnail (General) Singhs and Karnail (Colonel) Singhs. But one has not come across an Admiral Singh or an Air Marshal Singh.

During the Sri Lankan operations of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force, it fell to the Indian Navy to ferry across the Indian Army and its equipment. During the three years, the Navy transported to and fro over 300,000 personnel, hundreds of tanks and over 70,000 tonnes of equipment, food and stores, all without an accident or casualty. They also undertook a constant patrol of the sea approaches to the island. All with nary an acknowledgement or appreciation from the Government or public.

The same is the case with the Kargil operations. The contribution of the Air Force is mostly forgotten. Yet, without the softening of defences of the well-dug-in militants, the casualties on the Army side would have been greater.

Thus, the two smaller Services are wary of too much jointmanship lest they and their achievements get swallowed up by the bigger Service. India's politicians have been of no great help. When asked how they treated the three Services, a respected and knowledgeable defence minister made a telling comment: "We listen carefully to the Army, we humour the Air Force and we ignore the Navy."

Like the Indian public, the politicians are more or less ignorant about the military and the roles of the different Services. For centuries, they have heard of the Indian Army and have been used to dealing with only the soldier. In any country, where jointmanship has been perfected, war is prosecuted through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Not so in India.

Although a Chiefs of Staff Committee has existed, it is mostly ignored. The civilian power will always deal directly with the Army Chief.

When Indira Gandhi felt that war was inevitable in 1971, she only called the Army Chief, General Manekshaw, to a cabinet meeting and asked him when he would be ready. After the war, only the Army Chief was made a Field Marshal.

Inter-Service rivalry exists in all countries. The job of the politician is to smooth over such rivalry and encourage jointmanship. India is the only country where the bureaucracy actively encourages rivalry, largely to the ignorance of the politician.

To achieve jointmanship, the political leadership must recognise the role of each Service and treat them with equal importance. Given our historical background and the political ignorance, it is unlikely that India's armed forces will be able to overcome their inhibitions and achieve a higher degree of jointmanship.

An astute defence minister can overcome the difficulties and force greater integration down the throats of the Services. But until that happens we will have to be content with the annual photographs of the smiling chiefs.

Admiral J G Nadkarni (retd)