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The Rediff Special/ Professor Stephen P Cohen

India may not be China, but neither is it an insignificant 'Third World' State

There is little reason to doubt that India is emerging as a powerful state that will dominate South Asia politically for some time to come. India's economic growth underlies its enhanced significance. Following the implementation of economic reforms in 1991, India has reached respectable growth rates of 6 to 7 per cent, which if sustained, will give New Delhi considerably more weight in the region and abroad. Although its national economy will remain much smaller than China's for the foreseeable future, India's sizable middle class -- estimated at between 200 and 300 million people -- and its requirements for several hundred billion dollars in foreign investments make the subcontinent a market not to be ignored.

In addition, the prospect that India might be torn asunder by ethnic, regional, or religious conflicts has receded. India is a socially complex federal system, with pragmatic coalitions functioning at both the state and national levels, with all of the problems and virtues of such systems. Yet each national election -- and there have been three in the last three years -- has shown that Indians are capable of managing coalition governments.

The stage is thus set for an important change in US-Indian relations. Differences remain, but there are common interests as well. India needs American investment and technology, which is likely to get as it becomes a more attractive market for American businesses as well as a critical supplier of software and other computer products. There may even be a convergence of views on Pakistan. Indians came to appreciate the balanced and effective US diplomacy that helped end the 1990 and 1999 crises. While India certainly doesn't want a powerful, aggressive, military ruled Pakistan on its border, a weak and unstable neighbour teeming with threats from loose nuclear weapons, Islamic terrorism, and a potential flood of millions of migrants is not in New Delhi's interest either.

America's new approach to India should operate at several levels: Strategic, operational and economic.

Strategically, the US should regard India not as another South Asian State comparable to Pakistan, but as a player in the larger Asian sphere. India may not be China, but neither is it an insignificant 'Third World' state. A presidential visit in the first half of 2000, the first since 1978, would go a long way towards acknowledging India's growing importance.

An altered strategic relationship between the US and India also implies a reexamination of basic policies. There are important differences in their strategic world views, but both countries are essentially status quo powers, and should try to co-ordinate their views on issues such as nuclear proliferation, coping with the new military government in Pakistan, terrorism, and dealing with larger issues of Asian stability and order. As for terrorism, both the US and India have been singled out as enemies by Osama bin Laden.

This recognition of overlapping interests requires practical application. A small start was made recently with the first consultations ever held between the US and India over the Afghanistan problem. But Washington and New Delhi need to get into the habit of regular consultation over a range of issues. It would be well to expand the frequency of meetings of American and Indian defence experts, policy planning staffs, terrorism and arms control specialists and parliamentarians in both countries to break down prevailing misperceptions and stereotypes.

As for economic ties, these will eventually provide the ballast for a more stable US-Indian relationship because the economies of the two countries are complimentary. But because the economic relationship is still fraught with distrust (on the part of India) and irritation (on the part of the US), both countries should support and fully utilise the conflict resolution procedures available in the World Trade Organisation. These can help resolve differences between the two states over allegations of discriminatory tariffs, unfair trade practices, and violations of intellectual property rights.

Pakistan: Rebuilding democracy

Pakistan is not a failed state, but its political and social institutions have been in decline for some time. The recent military coup is another 'last chance' for Pakistan, an opportunity to move its institutions towards social and economic reform and political coherence. Unlike Mohammad Zia ul-Haq's coup in 1977, the 1999 army takeover was popular. Yet Pakistan's general would be wise to plan on an early withdrawal, although they will likely retain a formal role in a successor civilian government, possibly, along the lines of Turkey's National Security Council.

If the present Pakistani military leadership fails to manage this transaction, it is not likely to be replaced by a more liberal group. The prospect of the situation turning far worse has tempered American, Chinese, Iranian, and even Indian reactions to the coup. It is in every country's interest to see Pakistan hold together, although it is in no one's interest to see it challenge India again, serve as a base for radical Islamic movements, or become an unstable entity armed with nuclear weapons.

The US should institute three major policy initiatives towards Pakistan. All would aim to help stabilise Pakistan by restoring a more effective civilian government that would be compatible with improved US-Indian relations.

First, the US should focus on the reconstruction of Pakistan's civilian institutions. There are considerable opportunities for American foundations, universities, and other public and private entities to expand their support for the institutions that sustain democracy in Pakistan. Care should be taken to ensure that sanctions against Pakistan do not restrict such support.

Second, the US should restore US-Pakistan military training programmes, send Americans to study at Pakistani military schools and bring Pakistani officers to the US. Studying in an American institution does not ensure democracy, but the overall record shows that Pakistani officers who have been trained in the US or Great Britain have a more balanced perspective on the role of the armed forces, a more secular outlook, and a better sense of the changes occurring in the wider world.

Finally, the US should judge Pakistan's present regime on its merits, not its uniform. To the degree that Islamabad's military rulers move to reform the political system, root out corruption, restrain extremists, and pursue a conciliatory policy on Kashmir, there should be proportionate symbolic and material support for Pakistan. If Islamabad moves in this direction it should also receive high level, even presidential, attention in 2000.

While no US president has visited India in over 20 years, none has gone to Pakistan in over 30 years. India has been neglected by American policymakers, but correcting that error should not mean neglecting Pakistan, which is not only nuclear-armed, but by 2002 will be the world's sixth largest state, and perhaps once again its fourth largest democracy.

Professor Stephen P Cohen, the well-known expert on South Asia, is a senior fellow at the US-based Brookings Institution. This commentary is reproduced from the Brookings Policy Brief, with Professor Cohen's permission.

PART I: Need for a fresh look at US policies in South Asia

PART II:Need for US engagement in the Kashmir dispute

PART IV: The question, 'should Bill Clinton visit Pakistan,' is the wrong one

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