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Will Pak first call off the dogs of war?

From day one of the ceasefire, the terrorists have gone about their dispensation of death with greater impunity than before. If four soldiers were killed on day one, on Monday, the seventh day of the ceasefire, they had become so bold as to storm a CRPF camp in Anantnag. In the meantime, of course, various claimants to the peace process have descended on the national capital, trying to sell different versions of peace.

The disparate tendrils of smoke emanating from the peace pipe should tell the prime minister, and Indians in general, that the road to cessation of violence in Kashmir is an arduous one. What the current death-dance in Kashmir shows is that there is not just one finger behind the trigger. And, neutralising the hand is of little consequence so long as the sights are being set by remote control.

In that sense, India is faced with a challenge it has never encountered before in its history. In all the various insurgencies that the country has tackled successfully, the largest group -- whether represented by Laldenga, Ghisingh -- was able to bring around the other, smaller groups who had taken up arms against the State. In the Punjab, it was abetted by public ennui at the violence. In Kashmir, however, the insurrection is qualitatively different, in that the question of greater autonomy for the state, even azaadi, is inextricably enmeshed with the jehad being waged by imported terrorists.

To that extent, India could be making a grave mistake in tuning its policy on the same wavelength as it had while dealing with disgruntled elements in other states. What is called for is a two-pronged strategy: One that addresses local discontent, and another that will neutralise the Islamic extremism for which Kashmir is merely a means, not the end, to a diabolical goal.

Entangled in all this is the question of Pakistan's involvement in any future negotiations. This is an issue that cannot be ducked any longer, and the future of peace in Kashmir is viscerally linked to this crucial question.

It is axiomatic that Islamabad was able to get a toehold -- which has since widened to an entire leg -- in the state only because of the prevailing dissatisfaction there. More than a decade after the insurgency turned lethal, will Pakistan's role in fomenting trouble end if the native peeves were to be redressed? The answer to that question is obvious, and India needs to calibrate a response that will consider a lasting solution to the problem.

The ceasefire itself is a fait accompli, and there's no further point in going on and on over the negative aspects to it. Regardless of columnists' carping, ex-generals' horror, and the common man's scepticism, the government has put in place an ambitious proposal to usher in peace. But as compatriots in a tragedy, people have a right to know the full story as it has been scripted, and not just the bits and pieces that assorted official deem fit to propagate.

The fear over Kashmir is not about the bonafides of those who are willing peace to happen. The fear is that in their haste for results, a quick fix may take the place of a lasting solution which would only aggravate the situation beyond redemption. Therefore, insisting on Pakistan's exclusion from the talks may just derail the talks even before the interlocutors have begun talking.

Whether we in India like it or not, Pakistan has virtually become the amicus curiae in the Kashmir imbroglio, and to ignore it as a factor in the resolution of the conflict would be dooming the state to years of strife.

The question to ask is, does Pakistan's inclusion in the efforts to find peace affect India's sovereignty even one bit? With the answer to that obvious, it should silence all those who have been baying for excluding Islamabad from any negotiation on Kashmir.

Having declared its intention to wage peace in the state, there is no point in India resorting to half-measures. There is little to be gained in ignoring Pakistan without even knowing what the general and his men in khakis have in mind. After all, just as there are domestic compulsions propelling India on the road to peace, Islamabad's stake is even greater.

The reputation of being a pariah state is not what anyone would want for his country, and there is no reason to believe that Gen Musharraf would want to steer his nation on the road to perdition any more than Vajpayee. All those who consider themselves men of destiny have this tremendous urge to leave their mark on history, and Musharraf is in no way immune from it. In fact, both Vajpayee's and Musharraf's interests coincide on Kashmir; while one wants to go down in history as the man who brokered peace, the other wants to rescue his country from international opprobrium.

It is ironical that the two who have been cast in adversarial moulds actually need each other to realise their ambition. Vajpayee needs Pakistan to win Kashmir, and Musharraf needs New Delhi to pull his nation back from the brink. This is a reality that advisors on both sides of the border cannot ignore, or reject.

India should talk to Pakistan by all means, without any preconditions, to find out what its expectations in private are as opposed to its public posturing, without the fear that agreeing to talk will in anyway compromise either the government or the nation. What the nation needs to know is what price will be paid for ushering in peace, and whether it is affordable at all.

Saisuresh Sivaswamy