Pakistan's support for the Taleban, the Islamic dimensions of its nuclear policies and its support for extremist Islamic elements in Central Asia should therefore be seen as an integral part of its ambition to be a "frontline state" in promoting "militant Islam" across the globe.

This was confirmed by no less than Pakistan's able and articulate Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar just before the military takeover last October. Sattar and two other eminent Pakistanis then asserted that the decision taken in 1972 was primarily to "deter another Indian onslaught aimed at the territorial integrity of residual Pakistan."

One wishes that General Musharraf would take a leaf from the intellectual honesty of his foreign minister and stop shedding tears about why India's Pokhran test in 1974 forced Pakistan to go nuclear. Those who constantly assert in India that our tests in 1998 forced Pakistan to go nuclear would be well advised to remember that Pakistan's nuclear policies have their own rationale and dynamics. These flow from their perceptions on the need for a strategic "equaliser" to maintain "parity" with India and their belief that they do have a leading role to play in the "Islamic Ummah."

By the early 1980s China provided Pakistan with the design of a 25 kiloton nuclear weapon and also sufficient highly enriched uranium to build around four to five bombs. In their paper in October last year, Sattar and his associates Aga Shahi and Zulfiqar Ali Khan have claimed that in 1984, Pakistan had warned India about the use of nuclear weapons if India attacked the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant. Since a number of independent assessments confirm that Pakistan's own enrichment progamme had not advanced sufficiently to produce adequate enriched uranium for a bomb in 1984, it is only logical to conclude that Pakistan was in fact threatening to use Chinese designed nuclear weapons made from highly enriched uranium supplied by China. It needs to be remembered that the then foreign minister of Pakistan, Sahibzada Yakub Khan, was present at China's Lop Nor test site when a 25 kiloton device was tested in May 1983.

There is also good reason to believe that China looks the other way as heavy water supplied by it is diverted to this unsafeguarded reactor. Interestingly, while the Reagan administration chose to turn a blind eye to China's assistance to Pakistan's nuclear programme in the 1980s, the Clinton administration has waffled, obfuscated and covered up facts on this subject during its nearly eight years in office. It remains to be seen how a Bush or Gore administration will now address this issue.

China and India do share many common interests in forums like the WTO and on issues pertaining to the environment and economic development. But one cannot ignore the fact that almost coinciding with Rajiv Gandhi's visit, China decided to supply Pakistan with M-11 missiles to match the development of the "Prithvi" by India. It is estimated that China shipped around 30 M-11 missiles to the Sargodha Air Base near Lahore under the agreement concluded in 1988.

Further, following the flight-testing of the "Agni" missile, China has supplied Pakistan with the 2,000 km range M-18 missile called "Shaheen II" by Pakistan. China is collaborating in these efforts with the rising star in the Pakistan nuclear establishment, Dr Samar Mubarak Mand, who is a quiet and low key professional like his Indian counterparts. Dr Mand is now overshadowing the brash and publicity addicted Dr A Q Khan.

It is acknowledged in Pakistan that with the setting up of the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant based on designs stolen by him now completed, Dr A Q Khan has outlived his utility. Further, allegations of financial irregularities in the A Q Khan laboratories cannot be entirely overlooked by a military regime claiming commitment to the principle of "accountability".

We obviously need to reduce tensions and enhance cooperation and confidence in our relations with China. But there is also a need to look at what needs to be done to make it clear to China that pursuit of its current policies will not be without its own diplomatic and strategic costs.

G Parthasarathy