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India's nuclear deterrence is not country-specific

India's draft nuclear doctrine has sprung some surprises. It is not what it promised to be, simple and Indian. It is the consensus, some say fragile consensus, of the National Security Advisory Board members without any inputs from the armed forces or other government departments.

It is woven around three principles: minimum nuclear deterrent, no first use and maximum restraint. In other words, a minimum nuclear deterrent with maximum strategic restraint. The draft nuclear doctrine has pre-empted the country's ongoing strategic defence review and, therefore, is only the framework for a nuclear deterrent strategy. Even that assumption may be premature as the new government will decide on the entire bandwidth of nuclear issues relating to CTBT, NPT and FMCT.

This politically well-timed document has certain features which are different from the initial pronouncements of the government. It was said that the Indian nuclear document will be home-grown, avoid the pitfalls of other nuclear weapon states and the deterrent itself would be small in size, simple in structure, credible, survivable and retaliatory. Further, the capability would be purely defensive to ward off nuclear coercion or blackmail, yet, give the country the strategic space, autonomy and reach in guarding its national security interests. Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh had also said that India would not reinvent the doctrine of the Cold War.

Before India and Pakistan carried out their nuclear tests, a covert non-weaponised nuclear deterrent had already been in place for nearly a decade. In the last one year, Jaswant Singh and US Undersecretary of State Strobe Talbott, in their eight rounds of talks, are believed to have come close to resolving the contentious issues. But differences persisted over quantification of the minimum nuclear deterrent, the posture and conditions for India joining the CTBT.

The five-page draft Indian nuclear doctrine is laid out in eight parts: a preamble, objectives, nuclear forces, credibility and survivability, command and control, research and development and disarmament and arms control.

On the face of it, the nuclear doctrine is no different from the one adopted by other nuclear weapon states. Initially India had named China as the reason for its nuclear tests. The doctrine however says the deterrence is not country-specific. It does not quantify or explain what is minimum about the deterrence. In fact, it is pegged on the triad of land, sea and air-launched nuclear weapons, which is a typical western not 'Indian' model. What is missing from the doctrine paper are the command and control mechanism, involvement of armed forces, the cost of the nuclear deterrent and linkages with ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. Yet, this is the first positive short step in the long march to attaining the nuclear capability goal.

The debate on the draft nuclear doctrine may have just begun. The reaction from western and other nuclear weapon states has been unexpectedly critical. The most shrill critique of the doctrine has come from the US. It has reverted to the pre-test rhetoric that it will lead India in the wrong direction, possession of nuclear weapons will give India less, not more, security and lead to an arms race.

China, which had maintained a studied silence after its initial bitter attack, has repeated the call for India to adhere to the UN Security Council Resolution 1172, which is virtually a cap and rollback. The G-8 group of countries and Japan have also reacted negatively. Only Russia has been even-handed.

In a tit for tat, Islamabad reported that its nuclear doctrine is being finalised and has described India's as an ominous development and a challenge and affront to Pakistan and the international community. Pakistan had assumed that the US had managed to persuade India not to operationalise its nuclear weapons capability. It has warned that it would be forced to follow suit and the growing conventional imbalance would intensify Islamabad's dependence on nuclear weapons to deter aggression.

Coming on the heels of the Kargil war, the draft nuclear doctrine has taken the lid off the nuclearised subcontinent. Initial US reaction suggests its determination to cap India's nuclear capability at the non-operational level. Pakistan appears willing to accept this status and join the CTBT. India has indicated it is prepared to discuss the doctrine. India is equally determined to go ahead with the development and induction of the Agni serial programme, though it too is willing to enter the CTBT under certain conditions. At present India's nuclear weapon-delivery capability is rather rustic. The next phase of the nuclear doctrinal war will see the international community and Pakistan arrayed on one side and India probably isolated on the other.

General Ashok K Mehta