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It's time to defeat the jihad from across

Kargil, which had temporarily disappeared from the news pages but not from public consciousness, is back in the news after the military coup in Pakistan. It will undoubtedly return with a bang once the Subrahmanyam Committee report is tabled in Parliament. The post-Kargil operational scenario was discussed last month by the army commanders at a special conference in Delhi.

The unprecedented attack last week against the Badami Bagh Corps Headquarters in Srinagar by the Lashkar-e-Toiba, coinciding with their international conference at Lahore, is the most daring commando raid in the history of insurgency in J&K. The earlier attacks on army posts were spectacular in their own right but a direct assault on the gateway to the cantonment is breathtaking. It marks a new high in the proxy war. This is not a one-off attack but the curtain raiser to the start of a more vicious phase of insurgency.

Fortunately, it is all quiet on the Kargil front as both sides are busy building new posts close to the LoC where none existed before the war. These defences on the Indian side were to be completed before the Srinagar-Leh road closed in mid-November and winter snows blanketed the region. Kargil has been upgraded from a brigade to a division while Ladakh has grown from one to a two-division corps sector.

It is clear the military take-over in Pakistan was the fallout of the Kargil misadventure. It is equally clear that the intrusions had a limited aim: to interdict the Srinagar-Leh road by occupying heights overlooking it without triggering off a war. The intrusions were designed to invite frontal Indian attacks in last-ditch battles on Kargil heights, thereby internationalising the issue of J&K.

The post-Kargil assessment of Pakistani defences, communications, logistic stocks, living conditions and captured documents reveal that the intrusions started sometime in April 1999. The stories about Pakistani soldiers wining and dining in Dras hotels, visiting Srinagar or buying cement bags from Kargil to construct multi-storeyed fortifications are yarns. There are other misperceptions about the intrusions: that shepherds not soldiers first detected these, there is civil habitation near them and these are winter-vacated posts.

The Kargil colours have gone to the 8 Mountain Division, the formation that was rushed there after the intrusions were detected around May 10. 56 Mountain Brigade had deployed two battalions to contain intrusions in Mashkoh and Dras while the third battalion (18 Grenadiers) established the crucial firm base 1000 feet below Tololing at 15,000 feet. 8 Mountain Div was tasked to clear nearly 50 pockets of intrusions in Mashkoh.

This is the story of the 8 Mountain Division. When it arrived, Kargil was in panic and down to barely five days of stocks and supplies. The positioning of troops and additional stocks took nearly two weeks. This was the period when soldiers suffered heavy casualties, being out in the open without gaining any foothold on the heights. This became the cause of worry among some commanders. The first big attack and success of the war was the attack on Tololing on June 12-13 by 2 Raj Rif from the 18 Grenadiers firm base. The capture of Tololing enabled, for the first time, the troops to look into enemy intrusions.

The capture of Tololing was the turning point of the war as it provided the launch pad for further operations, specially against Tiger Hill which was captured by a brigade on July 4. The fall of Tiger Hill marked the beginning of the end for the enemy.

Operations were planned at 8 Div headquarters. There was no interference from higher headquarters that were standing by to provide additional resources for battle. The attacks were multidimensional, avoiding spurs. Movement and securing ground was by creeping up along the ridges that run north-south. Valleys were dangerous averages. It was therefore difficult to cut off enemy intrusion.

Air and artillery support had a major psychological impact on the enemy and the outcome of the attacks. The bulk of the 180 killed in 8 Mountain Div were due to their being out in the open and Pakistani guns firing air-burst rounds. Pakistani soldiers, on the other hand, were protected by sangars, igloos and in some cases, caves behind their posts. One such cave was found behind Tiger Hill, large enough for 25 soldiers. The commanders acknowledged that Pakistani soldiers fought with great courage and tenacity.

Of the 16 battalions involved in the war, only 10 were employed at Kargil. High morale and motivation of troops due to the visible groundswell of public support and the savage torture of Indian prisoners were critical to the victory. Young officers were upset and angry over the 'safe passage' given to the enemy. But the jawans fought bravely without regard for casualties. 2 Raj Rif alone lost four officers.

Pakistani guns will no longer be able to bring down observed artillery fire on the Srinagar-Leh road though predicted fire will be possible. An additional 50 to 60 new posts, at places made of prefabricated defences, have filled the gaps through which the intrusions took place. Two more brigades of six battalions have been deployed -- one each at Kargil and Batalik.

The army's 12 Corps headquarters is being raised at Leh, controlling the two divisions, one facing Pakistan and the other China. This rationalisation in operational control by the army will bring long-term gains in border management and dealing with anti-infiltration and counterinsurgency operations.

Pak forces in Kargil were jockeying to occupy positions of vantage near the LoC despite the agreement between DGMOs to maintain a 100-metre no-man's land. Some firefights have taken place. But the fire has subsided without catching the media's eye. No one, for example, is making an issue of nearly 200 soldiers killed in counterinsurgency operations after Kargil in other sectors of J&K.

8 Mountain Division has played a major role in evicting intrusions and defeating the Pakistan army at Kargil. Its switch in 1990, from a counterinsurgency division in the North-East to the Srinagar valley and now to a high altitude mountain division at Kargil, is covered with success. It bagged nearly 80 per cent of the gallantry awards and aptly carries the motto: Forever in Operations

Some outrageous statistics on the cost of the Kargil war are being bandied around. They range from Rs 5 billion to Rs 50 billion. The actual cost of fighting the war has been estimated to be no more than Rs 7 billion. This includes the panic buying of sundry items like socks at pounds 45 a pair. The 'cost plus' which includes new equipment ordered, is another Rs 5 billion. And with compensation for casualties, the figure is Rs 10 billion. In no case, can the overall cost of Kargil exceed Rs 15 billion unless future acquisitions are tagged to it.

The ASSOCHAM estimate that the new deployment at Kargil will cost Rs 40 billion to Rs 50 billion annually is a gross exaggeration. The Siachen bill is just Rs 3 billion. Maintaining an additional five battalions at Kargil will incur an additional cost of Rs 1 billion at most. Uninformed estimates on Kargil at a time when a supplementary demand to the defence budget is round the corner can be both dangerous and misleading.

Having won back Kargil, it is time to sanitise the Srinagar valley and defeat the jihad from across the LoC. The passes will close soon and the Taliban jihadis will have to return to populated areas for refuge and succour in winter. A sustained and resolute military operation and a well-knit anti-infiltration and counterinsurgency grid alone can prevent the defiant Badami Bagh type of raid on army camps and posts in Srinagar. The custodians of human rights and the world at large need to be told the anti-jihad war is in self-defence.

General Ashok K Mehta