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The Rediff Special/Gaurav Kampani

The Military Coup in Pakistan: Implications for Nuclear Stability in South Asia

The ouster of a legitimately constituted civilian government by the army for the fourth time in Pakistan’s 52-year old history, has underscored the question of political stability and viability of democracy in the country.

From an arms control perspective, the military takeover raises significant questions about nuclear stability in South Asia. Concerns have centered around five issues: (1) the removal of civilian filters in the nuclear decision-making process; (2) reported divisions within the higher echelons of Pakistan’s army that may impact on the custody of nuclear weapons; (3) whether the replacement of a civilian government with military hardliners will result in the intensification of the low-intensity war between India and Pakistan in Kashmir with risks of escalation to the conventional and nuclear levels; (4) whether the imposition of additional economic sanctions on Pakistan by the United States and international financial institutions will weaken the Pakistani government’s commitment to export controls on nuclear technologies; and finally (5) Pakistan’s commitment to multilateral arms control measures such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Civilian Filters and Nuclear Decision-Making

Fears that the coup could leave Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal in the military’s hands, unfettered by civilian control, are exaggerated. The degree of actual civilian participation in Pakistan’s nuclear decision-making has always been limited. In Pakistan, the military has been responsible for major decisions on defense, security, and nuclear issues. The civilian governments have participated in the process, but only in a supportive role. Pakistani observers also doubt whether any civilian government would have had access to such information as the precise number of nuclear warheads that Pakistan has in its inventory, nuclear storage sites, number of delivery vehicles, operational readiness, existing fissile material stocks, future production rates, command and control chain, future plans on the architecture of the nuclear deterrent, and so forth.

Former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has claimed that she was never privy to the more sensitive nuclear secrets and was kept at the margins of the nuclear decision-making process by the military. The recently-deposed premier, Nawaz Sharief, might have had access to more information because of his better relations with the military at one juncture. In the aftermath of the nuclear tests conducted in May 1998, the Sharief government sought to assure its interlocutors that although the military in Pakistan retained custody of the nuclear forces, final release authority rested with the civilians.

Nonetheless, it is doubtful if the civilian government in Pakistan ever controlled the nuclear button. The civilian finger was probably one among two or three that controlled the nuclear button. The unsettling implications of this and the recent falling out between Sharief and the army over the withdrawal from Kargil would suggest that direct communications between an Indian civilian chief executive and his or her Pakistani counterpart may be insufficient to control a volatile situation or crisis in the future.

Custodial Control over Nuclear Forces

Reports of divisions within the higher echelons of Pakistan’s army have raised other grounds for concern. Pakistan’s army remains the last viable institution of state; it also has custodial control over the country’s nuclear arsenal. Divisions within the military command over policy could have potentially dangerous implications for the custody and security of nuclear warheads, delivery systems, nuclear materials, export controls, and nuclear terrorism.

The divisions within the higher military command were highlighted when General Musharraf retired his Quetta Corps Commander, Lt General Tariq Perwaiz on charges of holding an unauthorized meeting with Nawaz Sharief a week before the coup. Similarly, Lt General Saleem Haider, Corps Commander, Mangla, was transferred for leaking information about a Corps Commanders conference to the political leadership. Following the coup, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto told CNN that Pakistan was in the midst of a “civil war” as armed units loyal to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharief were resisting coup orders. The manner in which Sharief fired Musharraf and tried to foist the head of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate, Lt General Khwaja Ziauddin, on the army hints of cracks in the military command. Addressing the nation soon after deposing Nawaz Sharief, the coup leader, and now Chief Executive of Pakistan, General Musharraf, cited Sharief’s attempts to divide the army as one of the primary reasons that led it to stage a coup.

Despite several indicators of differences within the army, the smoothness of the army takeover suggests that the unity of the Pakistani army as an institution remains intact. The majority of the Corps Commanders and the junior services (air force and navy) sided with General Musharraf to depose the civilian government. Although internal differences may have existed over policy, these do not necessarily extend to the nuclear realm. The army retains custodial control over Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and that custody remains robust.

Intensification of the Low-Intensity War in Kashmir

However, the ascendancy of the military in Islamabad could lead to a stepping up of the low-intensity war between India and Pakistan in Kashmir. General Musharraf is rumored to be an anti-India hardliner. He is also believed to be the key instigator behind the Pakistan army and Mujahideen’s spring 1999 intrusion and seizure of the Kargil heights on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir.

In the wake of the coup, two schools of thought have emerged in New Delhi. The first school discounts the prospects of increased tensions or crises along the Indo-Pakistani border. The Pakistani army, according to this view, is more likely to become preoccupied with the day to day tasks of governance. Pakistan’s failure to internationalize Kashmir, military setback in Kargil, diplomatic isolation, economic crisis, and the closure of strategic passes with the onset of winter, provide disincentives for another Kargil-type venture or increased support to the Kashmiri militants.

However, there also exists a contrarian view, which regards the ascendancy of the military in Pakistan with great alarm. Proponents of this view believe that Nawaz Sharief was India’s best bet in Islamabad. With his ouster, the Lahore peace process is dead. India can now expect increased tensions over Kashmir. Musharraf has already identified Kashmir as a core concern and reiterated Pakistan’s support to the Kashmiri militants. With the civilians out of the reckoning in Islamabad, there exsist few, if any, institutional curbs on the Pakistani military from repeating its mistakes. The pessimists in New Delhi also fear that the army might try and avenge Pakistan’s diplomatic and military humiliation by intensifying the sub-conventional war in Kashmir.

Musharraf has sought to allay Indian and US concerns of renewed border tensions and crisis escalation by ordering a unilateral withdrawal of the Pakistani army units along the international border in Punjab and Rajasthan. However, he has ruled out any reductions along the LoC in Kashmir. The Indian foreign and military establishment does not regard Pakistan’s unilateral withdrawal as a meaningful confidence building measure (CBM) so long as Pakistan continues to support the Kashmiri militants. India has also made the resumption of any negotiations with Pakistan contingent on what New Delhi describes a reduction in “cross-border terrorism.”

Hence, the military coup in Pakistan has raised the likelihood of greater tensions between the South Asian rivals in Kashmir. Indian counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir and Pakistani-backed infiltration and exfiltration operations along the LoC have the potential to escalate to a large-scale conventional war and possibly a nuclear exchange.

Commitments on Nuclear Export Controls

Finally, there are concerns that economic sanctions imposed by the United States and the international community in the wake of the military coup could worsen Pakistan’s macro-economic crisis. Sanctions might force a bankrupt Pakistani government to sell its nuclear and missile technologies abroad. Further, sanctions could also detract from the goal of securing Pakistani cooperation on critical multilateral arms control agreements such as the CTBT.

These concerns need to be tempered with a dose of realism. Although the United States is opposed to the overthrow of democracy in Pakistan, there is a growing realization in Washington that the United States has very little direct influence with the Pakistani army. Pakistan was already severely sanctioned as a consequence of its May 1998 nuclear tests. Washington has therefore indicated that it is prepared to deal with the new military regime in Islamabad. The Clinton administration is no longer insisting on the immediate restoration of a civilian government to power. Instead, Washington has demanded a timetable for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan.

Pakistan currently owes nearly $30 billion in external debts. Its hard currency reserves of little over $1 billion are barely sufficient to cover a few weeks of imports and are rapidly dwindling. It is thus critically dependent on the Paris Club for debt restructuring and continued international institutional lending to keep its external sector solvent. In light of the high possibility of sanctions-induced economic and political instability in Pakistan, the Clinton administration is unlikely to go beyond imposing the very limited sanctions that are mandated under Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act or to lean on international financial institutions to terminate support for Pakistan’s economy.

The erstwhile civilian government in Pakistan had made the signing of the CTBT contingent on two conditions: (a) an easing of the coercive atmosphere (read US economic and technological sanctions regime that was constituted to punish Pakistan for its May 1998 nuclear tests); and (b) India’s signature of the CTBT.

After the US Congress granted a permanent sanctions waiver authority to the executive branch, the Clinton administration was expected to provide sanctions relief to Pakistan in order to persuade it to sign the CTBT. The military coup has obviously put a brake on the momentum of events forcing the Clinton administration to respond with a partial sanctions waiver. However more sanctions relief can be expected should Pakistan decide to sign the CTBT.

In his 17 October speech, General Musharraf reiterated Pakistan’s commitment to a “nuclear and missile restraint” regime in South Asia and “sensitivity to global nonproliferation and disarmament objectives.” Economic revival, tax reforms, and restoring domestic and foreign investor confidence in the Pakistani economy remain high on the army’s agenda. Should Pakistan’s economy improve as a result of a new wave of reforms, then there would be less pressure on the present or any future Pakistani government to contemplate nuclear and missile sales to bolster a precarious economic situation.

Conclusion

The military coup has provided a setback to the prospects of some form of formal civilian control over Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent. Although the armed forces would have retained operational control under any civilian disposition, a formalized civilian institutional setting would have provided more room for caution, deliberation, and crisis stability. The coup brought to light sharp divisions within the military at the Corps Commander level; it highlighted the institutional schism between the ISI and the army. However, there is no evidence of vertical divisions within the army and the military as an institution. The cracks that were visible just before the coup appear to have been papered over. However, if the political impasse continues, economic pressures mount, and sectarian violence worsens further, those cracks could reappear.

A more serious cause for concern is the possibility of greater armed support by the Pakistani military to the militants fighting the Indian government in Kashmir. Such a policy would invariably lead to a state of permanent tension between New Delhi and Islamabad. A repeat of Kargil-type operations in the future could also increase the chances for an expanded conventional war and nuclear exchange in the region.

The Indian government could also respond by encouraging and arming disgruntled ethnic and sectarian groups within Pakistan. Another option often debated in New Delhi is to drive Pakistan into bankruptcy by forcing it into an expensive conventional and nuclear arms race. In the medium- and long-term, both options might threaten the existence of the Pakistani state, with extremely dangerous implications for nuclear command and control, secure custody of nuclear weapons and materials, export controls on weapons of mass destruction technologies, and nuclear terrorism.

At present, Pakistan remains committed to export controls on sensitive nuclear technologies. There are also indications of Pakistan’s willingness to sign the CTBT if the United States were to extend long-term sanctions relief. Pakistan’s military regime might also sign the CTBT as a means of securing greater acceptability and legitimacy in Washington. However, Pakistan’s ratification decision will be closely tied to the CTBT-debate in New Delhi and the ratification decisions of other nuclear weapon states.

Given the complexity of the above scenario, the international community must avoid sanctioning Pakistan any further. Political engagement and continued external financial lending would better serve to support the goals of restoring a viable system of democratic governance in the country. Engagement is also vital to secure the military regime’s continued commitment to export controls and multilateral arms control agreements. The international community must also continue to support CBMs between India and Pakistan, discourage any Kargil-type military operations, and encourage the resumption of the Lahore peace process.

Although the international community cannot condone the removal of a democratically elected government through armed force, in Pakistan the existence of elected governments has never really translated into democratic governance. The supposedly democratic governments have epitomized tyranny, corruption, and misgovernance. The ambitious reforms outlined by Pakistan’s army, therefore, provide some hope for social, economic, and political stability, and an eventual return to a more viable democracy in the near future.

Gaurav Kampani is a Research Associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the CNS or the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

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