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Fallen in the fray

There are no winners, only losers, in the high-tension naval battle that is being fought in the South Block regarding Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat's sacking. Had Chief of Army Staff General K S Thimayya not been inveigled into withdrawing his resignation in 1956, the present standoff in civil-military relations may never have occurred. Now, following Niloufer Bhagwat's outburst against the government, the battle has been joined by Defence Minister George Fernandes, who has levelled even more serious charges of violation of national security against Admiral Bhagwat.

Admiral Bhagwat's perceived defiance and non-implementation of government orders appointing Vice-Admiral Harinder Singh as his deputy and other undisclosed acts of defiance against the established order were given as reasons for the President of India and the supreme commander of the armed forces to terminate Admiral Bhagwat's services with immediate effect. But at the heart of the low intensity conflict between the MoD and the naval headquarters is the failure of successive governments in meeting the military's long-standing demand for greater autonomy and maintaining the sanctity of its chain of command while accepting the principle of civilian political control.

Admiral Bhagwat is the first casualty of this proxy war. He dared to question the property and legality of political control being hijacked by civilian bureaucrats. This challenge was perfectly valid, only the methods he employed were questionable. Just to mention two of them -- he prepared and disseminated strategic policy papers highly critical of the government and the bureaucracy and went public over his inability to implement government orders.

The fact that service chiefs and the defence secretary have almost never enjoyed harmonious working relations is well known. What is not well known is that absolutely nothing has been done about it. It is ironic that the sacking of a service chief has come from a BJP-led government which had promised to correct such and other deficiencies in defence policy and personnel management.

Periodically, the higher defence management system comes under strain and breaks down. It is then either glued or simply glossed over. The four-fold message from the recent revolt in the Indian Air Force and the Bhagwat episode is clear: the existing higher defence and security structures have gone dysfunctional, civilian bureaucratic control has become an infringement of the military chain of command, the country's courts are getting a greater say in command functions and the military itself has lost faith in the system.

This collective breakdown was inevitable given the fact that the communication channels between the armed forces and the government are blocked. That is the reason why service chiefs have had to go public repeating their demands about funding, autonomy and red tape. The political leadership on the other hand has parried these concerns with usual patriotic rhetoric like defence and national security are its primary concerns without taking any concrete action. The adversarial relationship between defence bureaucracy and service headquarters, taking the military for granted and excluding them from the decision-making loop have brought about the present standoff.

Next to military funding, the biggest sore point is the selection, promotion and appointment systems. Unfortunately, as disputed court cases have revealed, there are many aberrations in it. Further, there is no uniformity even where applicable among the three services. Take the Naval Regulations, 1957, which Admiral Bhagwat has quoted for making the recommendations of the CNS binding on the government. Still further is the gross external interference and extraneous influence brought to bear on the promotions systems. Communal, caste and political considerations must not corrode the military.

The previous defence minister and others in the past set unacceptable precedents in tampering with this system already riven with anomalies. In one respect, therefore, the courts have made a positive contribution, correcting injustice and directing the government to make and publicise promotion policy where none existed. But in another case, the courts interfered in a specific posting, which is the prerogative of the service chief and the government.

Admiral Bhagwat had the honourable options of resigning once the government overruled his recommendation. He stuck to his guns on the legal advice he received from his advocate wife. This was at the root of non-compliance of orders. According to one source, Admiral Bhagwat seriously believed that a weak coalition government that dithered for 20 days deciding his case would never dare to sack him, especially since no service chief had ever been sacked before. In fact, he had already taken over the additional post of chairman, chiefs of staff committee, albeit without government clearance.

Recently in Pakistan, COAS General Jehangir Karamat called for good governance and a national security council. This caused a furore. Uncharacteristically he resigned. In 1992, COAS General S F R Rodrigues had also called for good governance. George Fernandes, then an MP, demanded his resignation. The government however settled for an apology. Admiral Bhagwat's is the first sacking of a chief in India. But Generals P S Bhagwat and S K Sinha were sidelined for COAS. Without going public or to court they accepted the government's decision, but neither faded away.

The sacking of Admiral Bhagwat is not merely an assertion of civilian authority. It has more to do with Admiral Bhagwat the man, than Bhagwat the CNS. Therefore this act of the government should not be construed, as in Pakistan, of putting the military in its place. In India, the military not only knows its place but has accepted it too. Its officers are called commanders first, managers later. Therefore, the armed forces must not be treated like any other government department or service.

The deformed defence management structures have to be set right. Reforms are urgently required to institutionalise civilian political control, making it responsive to greater autonomy for the services and compatible with their legitimate aspirations. Therefore the reform package announced on January 5, 1998 by the defence minister hasn't come a day too soon. A service chief has paid the price for it.

Lt General Ashok Mehta (retired) served with the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka and will contribute a fortnightly column on defence issues to Rediff On The NeT.