ELECTIONS '98
COMMENTARY
SPECIALS
INTERVIEWS
CAPITAL BUZZ
REDIFF POLL
DEAR REDIFF
THE STATES
YEH HAI INDIA!
ARCHIVES

The Rediff Special/ Admiral J G Nadkarni (retd)

The Bhagwat episode: Morale is not a porcelain vase that it can break easily

A predictable aftermath of the Bhagwat episode has been the emergence of an entire brigade of retired servicemen, defence experts and even politicians who have raised a chorus of protest against the government's swift action to dismiss the ex-chief. They have not only condemned the action but even the crude manner in which it was carried out and the government's feeble efforts to justify it.

Many senior service officers have seen the sacking as an affront to the armed forces and have supported the admiral for standing up to what they perceives as a plot by the bureaucrats to keep servicemen in their place. Surprisingly, not many have blamed the political bosses for what ultimately was their decision. Most have termed the action as ridiculous, unwarranted and likely to damage the "morale" of the armed forces irretrievably. A leading national daily has gone to town publishing editorials and a number of supportive articles in a matter of five days. Now is, of course, the time for all good men to come to the aid of the party.

Having realised that the admiral dug his grave by not obeying the government's order, the FoBs (Friends of Bhagwat, not Bill) have resorted to semantics in their damage control exercise. "Admiral Bhagwat did not refuse to implement the order, he only said 'that it was unimplementable,' "say some defence pundits. Possibly there is a very subtle difference, which only lawyers can understand. As far as the common man is concerned, he is unimpressed by such sea-lawyer language. The Indian Navy is not a high court. The sailor knows defiance of authority when he sees it. Bhagwat's action was not only "not defensible" but the situation was getting intolerable.

One of the disturbing developments during the past few years has been the tendency of some members of the armed forces to "cultivate friends" outside the service. Politicians, defence experts, members of the civil service and media personnel of both the Left and the Right variety are quite susceptible to a bit of ego massaging and naval hospitality. They are only too glad to welcome anyone amidst the fold. For minor favours received, they will willingly bestow honorary titles. An "outstanding officer." "A "thinking general". A "visionary". When situation demands they will rush to your defence, flooding the media with articles and editorials. The opposition viewpoint will be blocked out. It would thus be worthwhile examining some of the comments in the media following the dismissal.

Many ex-Chiefs and servicemen have bemoaned the disastrous effect the sacking will have on the morale of the Armed Forces. Will it?

"Morale" is the most loosely used term by members of our armed forces. Nobody knows what it really means, what makes it go up or come down or even how long any effect lasts. Conventional wisdom and instinct are not particularly reliable when trying to gauge the effects of any event on morale. Victory in battle will certainly raise it, defeat will sink it. The morale of the men depends on such simple things as good food, pay rise, a foreign cruise or winning the regatta. The average sailor or even a junior officer is not seriously concerned with the office of the Chief or such weighty matters as the Services/Bureaucracy controversy. For all the difference it makes to him, one Chief is like any other.

So it finally comes down to the morale of a handful of senior naval officers who may fret about what is in store for them. And that is hardly representative of the whole service.

During the last few years the United States navy has been rocked by two events. In 1990 during a convention of the navy's aviators, things got out of hand. Female officers were sexually harassed in hotel lobbies, all with the knowledge of the navy secretary and the chief of naval operations. Both eventually resigned from their posts.

Three years ago, the US chief of naval operations was discovered to be wearing medals awarded for combat in Vietnam to which he was not entitled. Fearing exposure, he committed suicide by shooting himself. Both events hardly had any long lasting effect on the "morale" of the US navy. Morale is not a porcelain vase that it can break easily. It is made of sterner stuff.

Who is responsible for the Bhagwat fiasco? Primarily the entire event is a failure of the system. For matters to reach such a stage, where the only course open to the government was dismissal of the head of a service, indicates the failure of the promotion system, the failure of the appointments system and, above all, the failure of the selection system for the Chief's post.

A large portion of the blame has to devolve on the government. There were signposts all along the way. A critical examination of some events of the past would have revealed certain disturbing traits. A detailed examination of the officer's 400-page petition to the Bombay high court in 1990 should have at least made the government sit up and carry out a little investigation, especially as the officer had thought fit to tarnish the reputations of a large number of senior officials including the prime minister with his wild allegations.

It is at such times that the friends one has cultivated come to the rescue. How can an "outstanding" officer have any flaws? If any deficiencies are pointed out in reports by a senior officer, the reporting officer must be having a bias against our hero. Or must be corrupt. Or doing it for "financial considerations."

The present government can take shelter behind the fact that it was not in power when the officer was selected for the Chief's post. Yet they will do well to investigate how major flaws in any officer's character are ignored or go unnoticed at the time of selection. They are certainly to blame for allowing matters to come to a face saving situation.

Bhagwat's friends are equally to blame. They helped create such an aura of excellence around the officer that possibly he began to believe it himself. They bailed him out by intervening each time he ran into an obstacle. They saw senior officials on his behalf, wrote articles and editorials and condemned anyone who opposed him. Most of them knew him well. Did it never occur to these worthies that something may be wrong?

History repeats itself, first as farce and then as tragedy. The Bhagwat case is full of delicious irony and double standards. Consider the following:

* In defence of his decision not to implement the Cabinet Appointments Committee's order to appoint Vice-Admiral Harinder Singh as Deputy Chief, Admiral Bhagwat insisted that the Chief's "recommendation" was binding on the government. Yet eight years earlier, when he was fighting a case to become the Fleet Commander, he pleaded that the final decision in any proposal for appointment was that of the government.

* Both Bhagwat and his supporters have condemned bureaucratic and government interference in defence promotions and appointments. The government should respect the decisions of a promotion board consisting of the Chief and the senior-most officers of the armed forces, say the pundits. Ironically, Bhagwat himself is the product of such "intervention." It is well known that the Naval Headquarters promotion board of 1991, which included both the then and a future Chief, had not recommended Bhagwat for promotion to the rank of Vice-Admiral. He was promoted only after Sharad Pawar, then the defence minister, intervened.

* Bhagwat's supporters have quite rightly condemned the communal and other derogatory remarks made by Vice-Admiral Harinder Singh in his petition against Niloufer Bhagwat, the admiral's wife and lawyer. Yet eight years earlier the admiral, in his 400-page writ petition filed in the Bombay high court, had made equally damaging remarks and allegations against a whole bevy of people from the prime minister, principal secretary, defence secretary down to the Chief of the Naval Staff and 18 other senior naval officers.

No protests were heard from the "defenders" of all that is decent in the armed forces on that occasion. Presumably, like cholesterol, there are "good" derogatory remarks and "bad" derogatory remarks.

Eventually, the furore over the Bhagwat episode will die down. The sacking will have been worth it if the whole case is examined in detail and lessons drawn from it. Because the next time history will repeat as tragedy.

Admiral J G Nadkarni (retired), a frequent contributor to Rediff On The NeT, was the Chief of Naval Staff against whom Vishnu Bhagwat filed his petition in 1991.

The Bhagwat dismissal

The Rediff Specials

Tell us what you think of this feature