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Coping with the unexpected

With the election campaign reviving up, detractors of the war and critics of the government have put a sinister spin on the Kargil war. Based on complaints of the erstwhile commander of the Kargil brigade, Brigadier Surinder Singh, they have conceptualised a theory that the intelligence failure was part of criminal negligence to prevent the strategic catastrophe which cost so many young lives.

The frontal attack on the establishment suggest the government and army were forewarned but deliberately refused to act. Congress party spokesperson Kapil Sibal, in cahoots with the disgruntled brigadier, is the chief architect of this bizarre accusation. Sibal and Brigadier Singh have done a Bhagwat on the government. This time around, no distinction has been drawn between the army and government. In fact, the charge is now against Chief of Army Staff General V P Malik, the recipient of Brigadier Singh's letters and briefings who is alleged to have ignored his field commander's warnings.

Three weeks ago, Sibal took the lid off the Singh sleaze by quoting just the letter number of a confidential letter (number 124/GSD/Vis) dated August 25, 1998 to COAS which was a routine record of the army chief's visit on June 21, 1998. He failed to keep his promise to reveal the details of intelligence warnings probably cautioned by the Official Secrets Act and the rebuttal from the COAS that no letter of that description was addressed to him.

A few weeks after the Kargil surprise, people made slanderous charges accusing the government for ordering the army to leave gaps on the LoC and reduce the frequency of patrolling. For soldiers this was treason. A Bombay-based correspondent for Businessweek asked this writer to confirm these stories.

It is unthinkable that the army could ignore the warnings of the Kargil commander. Creative journalists lacking the understanding of military procedure and operational responsibility have embellished the Singh story and enhanced his threat perception. On his part, Brigadier Singh has admitted in writing on June 28, 1999 in his first and only letter to COAS that he had no inputs to even conceive of intrusions that took place.

Brigadier Singh was removed from command not just for failure to detect intrusions but for inept handling of subsequent operations to restore the situation. Whether singling him out was the right decision at the time is a moot point. What is not in doubt and acknowledged by the army is that others in the hierarchy are also culpable and being investigated. Brigadier Singh is not the fall guy.

The objectionable portion of the Singh episode is the penchant of journalists to make him the hero of Kargil and not what he turned out: the origin of the rot.

The larger question of intelligence failure must examine both intention and capabilities. Pakistan certainly has not, for some time now, had the capability to wage conventional war against India. Therefore, Low Intensify Conflict buttressed by nuclear deterrence has become its preferred option.

The Research and Analysis Wing is tasked to provide a 15-day warning for a war situation. In the prevailing LIC scenario, alarm bells that the Taliban surplus would transfer from Kabul to Kashmir, have been ringing periodically and army commanders acknowledged these warnings saying they were ready for them. So, some strategic intelligence input had been forthcoming. What higher intelligence could not indicate is the time and place for the incursions, the tactical dimension of a forewarning.

After the Taliban had seized 90 per cent of Afghanistan in 1997, this writer had indicated that the Taliban movement into Kashmir would follow the shortcut from Badakshan to Chitral and on to Gilgit-Skardu.

For gauging adversary intention existing political relations have to be factored. The country was misguided by intelligence intention inputs, first in 1959 when without a whisper the Chinese built the Aksai Chin road and later in 1962 the army was given the tall order of evicting the Chinese from Thaq La. This time the Lahore process could have created a false sense of Hindi-Pakistani Bhai Bhai.

In 1965, intelligence failed to inform government that Pakistan was down to two days of reserve ammunition or that Pakistan had raised a second armoured division, both critical strategic inputs. The Yom Kippur war completely surprised Israel. It altered the strategic equation on the battlefield, though, as in Kargil, the Israeli defence forces both retrieved and reversed the situation. Nevertheless, Egyptian intelligence scored complete strategic surprise by a brilliant cross-canal tactical manoeuvre.

Last year India conducted its nuclear tests duping the CIA. Indian scientists dodged the panoply of sophisticated US surveillance devices including humanint which is still the core of any intelligence apparatus. Indian intelligence stumped CIA at Pokhran. RAW, tapping the conversation between COAS General Parvez Musharraf and his CGS, Lieutenant General Mohammad Aziz Khan in the now famous China Tapes, was an intelligence coup.

So why did the intelligence arm of the government fail to forewarn the army of the Kargil invasion? This was Pakistan's Yom Kippur to break the stalemate over Kashmir. The ingenuity of this clandestine operation and its sheer tactical perfection have to be acknowledged and the Pakistani devil given full credit.

The fact is the Indian army simply failed to anticipate this type of an operation: intrusions staggered over a wide front. This was the unexpected among all its contingency planning. Capture by Pakistan of a single or a couple of posts on LoC, yes. But intrusions across LoC on this size and scale were, as Singh has admitted, never expected and therefore not catered for.

The Pakistan plan did not work due to an overkill of masks, disguises and denials. An undercover operation has its limitations converting into an overt one. It was undetected in its preparation and launch as secrecy was its hallmark. The success of the operation hinged on one single factor: Surprise. This contingency plan had probably been collecting dust in the Pak DGMO's closet for years.

It was pulled out by the commando bred and trained Parvez Musharraf and shared with just four others: Aziz Khan, GOC 10 Corps, Lt Gen Mohammad Ahmad, DMGO Lt Gen Taufiq Zia and GOC FNA, Major General Javed Hassan. Others came in at the time of the launch.

Extraordinary precautions had already been taken during the launch. No troops were brought in from outside, so no unusual movements. About 1,000 soldiers from the Northern Light Infantry already deployed there were used. Redeployment and preparations were carried out at night. Even the local Baltis were taken unawares. The forces and logistics were assembled and inducted in deafening silence. Incredible secrecy and deception made detection difficult and surprise complete.

The Kargil deployment has not changed since 1972. FCNA has been observing the large and tempting gaps across the LoC in Kargil for 27 years. An intrusion across the Kargil front was never anticipated by man or beast. Even large scale infiltration was discounted though some did take place through Dras in 1993.

The enhanced threat perception of 500 Afghans training in Gunkot referred to by Brigadier Singh in his briefings was not to the LoC but in his rear areas, 50 km away in the Padam valley and the road. In the war games and discussions he had with the army high command (COAS, VCOAs and DOCAS) there was no hint by him of encroachments. When asked by his army commander, who spent three days with him, to identify the weak points in his defence, Brigadier Singh said: 'I have none.' His request for additional troops was not for the LoC, but for Padam valley and the road.

The intelligence lapse was therefore in the collective mind of the army. It failed to see the Gunkot woods for the Padam trees. So far, so bad. But what about routine tactical operations to monitor the unheld gaps? This is where the battlations of the Kargil brigade, its commander Brigadier Singh and the Leh Divisional commander failed to carry out ground and air surveillance of the area.

The patrol programme is the most beguiling operational responsibility of fighting units in war and peace. Surveillance is carried out at least on paper over every inch of territory as domination, link, civic action, long range, composite and interformation patrols. In addition, air surveillance operations are carried out over difficult terrain in helicopters. This was done casually. It was not as if helicopters were not given as claimed by Brigadier Singh. He wanted one to be positioned next to him.

The Kargil brigade erred grievously on surveillance. Brigadier Singh's pleas that he did not get permission to send out patrols is ill-founded. A commander needs no permission to police his area. Equally flimsy is the excuse that snow boots and other equipment were not available.

A report is circulating in the media that Pakistan was scouting European markets for 50,000 snow boots. No one has asked why Pakistan would need boots to equip three high altitude divisions? Chandru Mahatane, a German NRI, well versed in the European shoe business has said had he been tipped off about Pakistan's shoe-shopping spree, he would have tracked them down and might have saved the day at Kargil.

Brigadier Singh had asked for satellite imagery, RPVs and the moon, as commanders everywhere are prone to, knowing full well these assets are non-existent. The truth is: Brigadier Singh has not said what has been widely attributed to him. He has been used by journalists and the Congress to sensationalise and distort the intelligence and operational lapses in Kargil. Politicising the army is bad enough, exaggerating and trivialising its deficiencies in the after glow of victory is merely mean.

The immediate upshot of the Pakistani misadventure is the reorganisation and upgradation of the Kargil brigade, part of the Leh division into a new corps with its headquarters at Leh. The clear lesson from Kargil is that the intelligence arms of the armed forces and the country have to be restructured and modernised along with the sword arm.

The internal and external reach of military intelligence has to be enhanced so that the army can detect the blip of aggression among the clutter of infiltration. There is need for a defence intelligence agency like the ISI in Pakistan as part of a national intelligence grid. At present Military Intelligence receives a princely Rs 50 million against Rs 5 billion for RAW and $ 50 billion for the CIA.

For weeks without success intelligence was scouring for Pak 19 infantry Division, its GHQ reserve for the hill areas to determine whether it had been moved opposite Kargil. Unfortunately, RAW with inadequate infrastructure and resources is not geared for a war-like situation.

Kargil was an intelligence and operational lapse. Brigadier Singh's letters and afterthoughts were no forewarning. He was part of the collective failure of mind. Indian psyche and intelligence, both need to be upgraded.

General Ashok K Mehta