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The Michael Krepon Chat

'I fear the treaty will be in limbo for many, many years'

Michael Krepon provided rare insight into the arcane Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on Tuesday night. The president of the Henry L Stimson Centre was engaged in an illuminating discussion with some of India's bestknown analysts on defence issues-- Achin Vanaik, Praful Bidwai, Raja Mohan and C Uday Bhaskar. Check out the transcript. It's fascinating.
amberish (Tue Aug 13 20:33:39 1996 IST):

hello, this is amberish from Rediff On The NeT. Michael, do you read me? We are all set to go on chat 2100 hours India, 1130 hours EST

hi, Amberish, this is Howard. just testing. if all works, I'll go get Michael.

still awaiting a reply from washington!

howard, got you. 10 minutes to go

hi vikas, r u there

Hi Raju, this is Vikas (using Amberish's login). Is everything working fine?

amberish: hi , hows life

amberish: hi , hows life

hey..

amberish: hi , hows life

Amberish: I'm tapping to tell you that India has company: Iran has also announced that it intends to block transmission of the CTBT from Geneva to the UNGA.

Hi amberish,everything is ok. when and how do we do this multiple chat thingy.

raju, please get Mr Prful Bidwai to log on with his name now!!

Vikas: Can u also put Mr. Achin Vanaik as one of the participants. This is urgent. Thank u.

Sure, Raju, Mr Vanaik can log in under his name. So also Mr Bidwai.

Vikas: Achin and Praful are at the same addres (Praful's Phone 011-4697278)

Krepon, one of Iran's concerns is the same as India's, that the NWs must commit themselves to a time frame. Looks like the idea is spreading, perhaps due to concern of being bullied in the future?

Mr Krepon, this is Nikhil Lakshman, editor, Rediff On The NeT. It is good to have you with us tonight. We have Mr Praful Bidwai and Mr Achin Vanaik joining us from Delhi tonight. I am sure this evening's Chat will be most illuminating. Thank you for appearing on the Rediff Chat.

Mr Krepon, let us begin now. Would you like to comment on how non-officals in the US view's India's stand?

Amberish: The idea of a timetable for diarmament remains firmly rooted in the game-plans of many states and NGOs, but I'm not sure that the idea is spreading. The NWS--except China--remain firmly opposed. The negotiating tactics by some NNWS in Geneva demanding more by way of preambular commitments toward complete nuclear disarmament may be tragically wrong. These tactics assume that the NWS are the demandeurs for a CTBT, and that this provides leverage to get more on disarmament. In fact, only the US Government is strongly interested in a CTBT at this point. The other NWS would just as soon see the Treaty wither and die. Moreover, support for the CTBT here in the US cannot be taken for granted--witness the Republican Party's presidential platform calling for a resumption of testing and opposition to CTBT ratification. The chances for a CTBT are slipping away.

Hello Mr Krepon,Why should India sign CTBT when it is surrounded by neighbours who have a track record of hostilities commited against India.

Mr Krepon, true that at this stage it is the US pushing the CTBT while others would rather watch it die. That is exactly the fear, especially India's, that others really do not want to de-arm. And how far can India go with a China on its borders, which even the US is wary of?

Mr Krepon, has Pakistan agreed to sign the CTBT? Is it true that Washington has struck a deal with Beijing to persuade Pakistan to sign the CTBT?

Nikhil and Amberish: Many thanks for inviting me to join you tonight for this chat. I am grateful to you for opening this direct line of communication. Right now, the Clinton Administration is quite concerned that chances for a truly comprehensive and verifiable test ban treaty are slipping away, in part because of India's stand, in part by the non-constructive roles played by other countries. Most recently, Iran has indicated that it would join India in taking blocking action, preventing the transmission of the CTBT from Geneva to the UN General Assembly. I'm not sure that this is the kind of company that India wishes to keep.

Mr Krepon, does this mean you wish India to sign the CTBT?

Mr Krepon, perhaps Iran's stance comes about because right now the US is planning sanctions against Iran. An Iran pushed against the wall is hardly going to be cooperative. And while, I suppose, India is wary of being identified too closely with Iran, its opposition to just a CTBT has been constant.

Nikhil: China's support for a CTBT has been less than fulsome, as is evident by Beijing's opposition to a flexible entry-into-force formula for the Treaty. My sense is that Islamabad would have great difficulty signing the CTBT if New Delhi refuses to do so. Benazir's political opposition has expressed itself against this course of action, which limits her freedom of maneuver on this issue. I am not privvy to whatever "deal" was struck between the US and Chinese governments, but I doubt if Beijing could or would choose to force Islamabad's hand on signing the Treaty--assuming one emerges from Geneva.

Mr Krepon, India is against joining the CTBT for fear of its security. So is the US in a position to give some sort of a guarantee against a nuclear threat to India? How valid and useful would such a guarantee be?

Mr Krepon, There is amazing consensus on this issue in India and no political party would ever risk ignoring that consensus and sign the CTBT. Again, many Indians feel Washington persistently ignores New Delhi's security concerns, so why they feel should India go along with the US on this issue?

Amberish: Iran is actively pursuing the nuclear option, as is evident from Tehran's purchasing interests on black markets, and its odd pursuit for a nuclear power program, despite its considerable oil reserves. Tehran would not be too displeased if the CTBT didn't happen, which may account for its unfortunate blocking tactics. Vinay: Yes, I would like India to sign Nehru's treaty, and I would like India not to block other states from signing Nehru's treaty. This treaty is an essential precondition to the elimination of nuclear weapons. I believe it would be tragic to loose this treaty in pursuit of objectives that are unobtainable at this time.

Is there a way out of the impasse? Or will the CTBT go ahead minus India, Iran and Pakistan? What happens three years hence? Some Indians fear likely sanctions if New Delhi refuses to sign by that deadline. Do you think that is possible?

hi michael, this is raja mohan and c uday bhaskar at the same number. could you tell us about the prospects for ratification of the ctbt in us congress, since the republicans seem tohave come out against the ctbt in their election platform?

Mr Krepon, the history of disarmament talks has been one of failures. And it fails because the status quo do not give any margin to accommodate the other powers-in-waiting. So how can this rigidity of the statu quo powers be overcome. And why on earth do Britain and France need nuclear weapons today. If they were to agree to disarm, would it not go a long way in convcing others of genuing disarmament desires?

Mr Krepon,invoking Gandhi and Nehru may cut little ice with the Indian people who are fed up with what they interpret as Washington's consistent balming of Pakistani interests, despite evidence of that country's nuclear programme. In any case, why is India's demand that the nuclear powers set a deadline for the obliteration of their nuclear arsenals impractical?

michael, has there ever been an EIF of this nature - where a nation that is opposing the draft is being named or shall we say being dragged into the treaty?and as a follow up - why was the US not able to prevail with the original EIF which talked about the five nuclear powers only?

Does this episode emphasise the rhythm that third world countries can influence the world, only, by putting their foot down? Comments..

Mr Krepon, can there not be a CTBT minus the recaltricant nations, who might be persuaded to join a few years later if they realise that there is no point in being out of the CTBT

To Pat, Kikhil & Amberish: I don't believe India would seek or accept US security guarantees in order to sign the CTBT. Even if such a guarantee were to be forthcoming from Washington, would it be believed? India has legitimate security concerns vis a vis China and Pakistan. This is not at issue. The real question is how India's security concerns are best advanced--with the CTBT or without it? Many of the articles I have read in India against the CTBT assert that the Treaty must be blocked because it would foreclose the nuclear option, and without the nuclear option, New Delhi cannot ensure its security. I find this argument very weak. India should have the scientific talent and capabilities to maintain the nuclear option WITHOUT TESTING. The design of simple fission devises is no mystery--the US figured this our fifty years agao without the benefit of computers. In other words, India should have the capacity to destroy a Chinese or Pakistani city with a Hiroshima-sized detonation without testing. India can design fission warheads for its recessed deterrent while signing Nehru's treaty. Is not twenty kilotons of damage enough to deter India's neighbors and to secure India's security? The CTBT will block India's ability to develop with confidence a THERMONUCLEAR, or fission, weapon. This would take a series of tests--without question. But why should India block a CTBT in order to maintain the option to design 200 kiloton weapons? Isn't a 20 kiloton weapon enough to destroy a city?

[praful and Achimn] we are on line now.

We are looking for information concerning India's views about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

We are looking for information concerning India's views about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

We are looking for information concerning India's views about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

We are looking for information concerning India's views about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

We are looking for information concerning India's views about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Mr Krepon: Do you think that it is fair for the government of the United States of America to talk about peace when they are sitting on such massive amounts of arsenal that can destroy Earth many times over, when the USA spends so much time trying to focus on other nations problems and causing problems in the bargain so that they can sell of their weaponery , Vietnam, Iraq..................some names to illustrate my point . Comment please

[Praful and achin]Michael: we tend to agree with your description of India's capabnility which the CTBT is not going to eliminate. We are appalled at India's atand. Two wrongs do not make a right. EIF provison concerning INdia is wrong but this does not justify India blocking the treaty. This risks losing a good arms' restrint measure at a crucial stage.

Mr Krepon, thanks. But a further query. Definitely there is no reason to believe that after doing everything to stop testing, attempts will not be made to spread computer technology which can help develop nuke bombs. In fact, a few years ago, the US admin stopped the sale of certain computers fearing that it would be used to upgrade weapons. What might happen is that there will be a total technology cartel, which would no way solve Indian fears.

Why is India spending so much on its Defences. It's not as if we want to the reason is we are worried about those nonsensical people sitting across the borders who will be using arms supplied by Washington.

amberish (Tue Aug 13 21:43:13 1996 IST):

Mr Krepon, why can't the US go even a little way in disarming itself and its allies, especially Britain and France who today have little use for their weapons. this would in turn weaken India's stance

Uday, aren't testing and dismantle two different issues? Everybody knows the chances of a conjunctive treaty, of this proportion, are slim. Was this not considered. What is your justification?

Nikhil: I see that I made a spelling error in my last transmission: The CTBT would not preclude an Indian fission nuclear option, but would preclude an Indian fusion nuclear option. You ask why a deadline for nuclear disarmament would not work in the NWS. Take the US, for example. The declarations that you most wish to hear and the commitments that you seek are absolute poison in US domestic politics. Any President that declared fealty to a time-bound fraework for complete nuclear disarmament would open himself to charges of weak-headedness by the political opposition, congressional resolutions of opposition, and a storm of protest by very powerful constituencies. As a mental exercise put yourself in the shoes of a US president. If you declare for a timetable, you gain support from third world nations, and you invite big problems with the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, the weapons labs, the military industrial complex, your own party in congress, the political opposition, editorial writers, etc. What would you choose to do? Ronard Reagan could talk about eliminating nukes without penalty because he was so hawkish, because he did not set deadlines, and because no-one took his vision seriously--not even the disarmament community here. I see no other political figure here who could afford to do this. Thus, I believe that the best strategy to adopt to devalue nuclear weapons is to maintain an absolute ban on testing, and to continue the practice of non-use, now 51 years in the making. Visualize a world in which nuclear weapons are not tested for the next fifty years. Visualize a world in which the practice of non-use contiues for another fifty years. How valuable will nuclear weapons be then? How large will stockpiles be? This is why it is so important to conclude the CTBT and have it enter into force.

how can India be let off the hook with regard to the EIF providoion which is unfare and destructive of the treaty?

star war - this is uday. yes, testing and dismantling are two different issues. my observation was apropos michael's point about the adequacy of 20 kilo-ton fission weapons. but while on this subject, i would argue that the indian stand perceived the ctbt as apart of a larger package towards disarmament. in that sense, the spirit to my mind would take testing and dismantling under the same umbrella. it is raining here in this part of delhi. where are you star war?

Michael, the idea of world where weapons are not tested for the next 50 years is wonderful, but perhaps utopian. Because in the absence of a definite method to resolve outstanding disputes, the temptation to go to war, and to use one's total arsenal, remains. Can we be sure that the NWS would never use their weapons, especially when there is no fear of a counter-attack?

Uday and Raja: Good to hear from you, albeit at a distance. Will be in Delhi in September--maybe we can get together again then. You ask about the Republican Party's opposition to the CTBT in it's platform. This, frankly, came as a shock, as there were no prior statements against the CTBT or for a resumption of testing by key party figures. But this goes to show you how captured the Republican Party has become to ideologues. How serious a problem is this? Hard to say. Dole and Kemp are both claiming not to have read the platform, and I doubt that nuclear testing will figure prominently in the election. But Dole's departure from the Senate will hurt ratification chances, for sure. Lesser folks are in key leadership positions, and may well take blocking action--assuming the Treaty makes it out of Geneva. Several have asked why the Treaty has been saddled with such a lousy entry-into-force provision. The simple reason is that a number of countries really don't want the CTBT to enter into force, and are using this procedural device to leave the nuclear option open. India has risen to the bait, and now, I fear, the Treaty will remain in limbo for many, many years. Surely, this is a great shame.

what is missing from the Indian debate is that the draft provides for a future conference that can alter the EIF provision.

Thank you, Mr Krepon. But the situation in India is about the same. No Indian prime minister could afford to sign the CTBT. It would be the chalice of hemlock for him. Just as a declaration that we seek from the US would be to an American president.

Uday, I am in Los Angeles, CA

Wwhy is the American government so condecending towrds the third world countries?

the Indian demand for 'time bound' link to ctbt is an utterly unconvincing cover for its own duplicity and its obsession wiht keeping the nuclear weapon's option including the fusion option indefiniteoy open.

Amberish: The idea of non-testing and non-use for the next fifty years may well be utopian, but this would be an easier task than phased reductions to zero. Actually, I propose to pursue both simultaneously, although not with the deadlines that India and other states demand. To me, a CD negotiations on deadlines for disarmament is a recipe for stalemate. Worse, it would let the US & Russia off the hook for START III, IV, & V. (Sorry for the fishing metaphors--have just spent a few days with friends dropping lines in the water.) Actually, the least difficult strategy is to demand no more tests and no more use. This is the most direct approach to devaluation.

Raja Mohan, when was India responsible for an imbroglio concerning nuclear issue? Any precedence. If so, is there a learning piece from that experience that you (India Ministry) are not employing to execute the CTBT successfully.

Nikhil: you can always create a situation thro media manipulation where a consensus is manufactured and then say that you cnanot sign a ctbt etc. the same govt signs unequa;l treaties e.g. gatt but refuses to sign a nondiscriminatory ctbt. Let's be precise. NPT is disciminatiory but a CTBT can at best be claimed to be disciminatory -- depending upon your interpretaition of various provisions. New Delhi's stand is unconvincing and inconsistent.

This is raj. Achin and Praful seem to think only India has motivations in its approach to the ctbt. What about the US? Why has the US been so enthusiastic about the ctbt after so many years? It is worth asking this question. Many US officials are on record saying that the principal gain --for the US-- from the ctbt is that it will freeze the nuclear capabilities of all others. That the UsS will gain much less from additional testing than the threshold states. The CTBt is part of a larger arms control strategy of the US where it wants to retain its primacy in the international system. Why do praful and achin love the US hegemony so much?

Michael, thanks. No more tests and no more use. Here comes one tricky part, how do we ensure that those with nuke weapons won't use them or blackmail others with them (precisely India's fears vis-a-vis China, and definitely Pakistan's fear against a nuke India). So what can be done to have some surety at this stage that signing a CTBT is not India's death warrant?

Praful & Achin: Thank you for joining us. I am at a loss to figure out how to mend the EIF problem at this late date. China, Russia, Egypt, Pakistan, Iran, and perhaps other countries have indicated that they cannot accept a less inclusive list of states that must sign, ratify without disabling conditions, and deposit ratifications before the CTBT's entry into force. Given the difficulties involved in getting 44 countries to take such action, it is mystifying why New Delhi has declared that it will block transmittal of treaty text from Geneva to New York. Hell: The Republican Party seems to have decided to take cary of India's problem. That India should have adopted such an extreme position is rather extraordinary. What is the matter of principle or sovereignty that is so great as to disallow other countries from signing the CTBT?

Nikhil: This is our sad lot: The political arguments that "work" in India are hemlock in the US; the arguments that "work" for a CTBT here (such as "stockpile steawrship") reinforce worst fears in India.

Raj: we will not descend to the gutter level. We have been consistently critical of the US and all other nuclear weapon states, more so than you and others who are preapared even to compromise on the NPT. Our opposition to the npt let's remind you, is a) more accurate b0 more comprehensive c) more consistent than yours, Subramaniam, sunderji etc. We do question US motives.But we are not so stupid as to argue that the motives determine the objective outcomes of all treaties or that motives should primarily decide whether India shoudl sign the CTBT.

Mr Krepon, do you think

Mr Krepon: Do you think it is fair for America to arm twist the other countries into signing the CTBT infact even talk about it, after they have perfected their Nuclear capacities and built up their arsenal as well as become A one stop shop for terrorists and warring nations

Amberish: You and Rajamohan and many other thoughtful and intelligent Indians talk about the coercise power of nuclear weapons--even though they may no longer be used, they still have political utility. This notion may have been true in the past, but is it true today? How "useful" were nukes in the Vietnam War? Or the Suez Crisis? When the US recently threatened Libya, elliptically, over the CW facility under construction, which country was more damaged--the US or Libya? Why continue to foster the myth that nukes provide political utility or coercise power? What power resides in a weapon that cannot be used? The real instrument of coercison today is economic power, not nukes. Stop repeating arguments that no longer make sense!

Mr Krepon, you mentioned a little while ago that the CTBT will be in limbo for many years. Does that mean the treaty is brain dead, and that the CD in Geneva will end in a stalemate? Is there hope for the treaty to be revived? And what will it take for that to happen?

michael, this is raj. i dont have to tell you that the US has drawn profound lessons from the gulf war. that nuclear weapons and other mass destruction weapons can be used to constain US conventional superiority in regional conflicts. Both the US nuclear posture reveiw and the counterproliferation doctrine have reemphasized the utility of nuclear weapons. Can we really deny that? I think the US is being prudent. why dont you give the same benefit of doubt to India?

Michael, there is no doubt that economic power means a lot more than weapons in the armoury. Which is why Japan is a power today, and India is not (nor for that matter suspected nuclear states like Pakistan, Israel, N Korea). But Japan is protected by being close to US and is part of US economic ties. Regarding the use of N-arms, that is precisely the fear: that the only time they were used was against a country that did not posses them (Japan, August 1945), and never again when there was a threat (howsoever remote) of retaliation - Vietnam and Suez had at least covert Soviet backing. In fact, other opposing powers kept a check, and today it is this very system of checks and balances that is missing. and which must be redressed, in part, by the US.

Mr Krepon, have you been in touch with the Pakistanis? Do you sense a weakening of their resolve?

michael, this is raj. i dont have to tell you that the US has drawn profound lessons from the gulf war. that nuclear weapons and other mass destruction weapons can be used to constain US conventional superiority in regional conflicts. Both the US nuclear posture reveiw and the counterproliferation doctrine have reemphasized the utility of nuclear weapons. Can we really deny that? I think the US is being prudent. why dont you give the same benefit of doubt to India?

Michael Krepon, If today's coercion is economic biggy, why not legislate the 'treaty pass' in U.N as majority & not unanimous. This was incidentally suggested by Jaap Ramaker of Netherlands. Secondly, if China, Russia, Britain and France opt to wait till India, Pak and Israel ratify your goddamn treaty, comments like the four B's are hiding behind Indian sari may not be very diplomatic. Capitol Hill has a reputation, you know.

Raja: You have become quite adept at putting those who disagree with your perspective on the defensive--but I miss your analytical talents. You ask why the US has all of a sudden become so supportive of the CTBT. Surely there must be some nefarious ulterior motives, such as putting India into a strait jacket. But I have already declared what you must already know: That India can still retain the nuclear --altho not the thermonuclear--option under the CTBT. Some strait jacket! The reason why the US now supports the CTBT is as follows: We finally have a president that wants the treaty that slipped through President Kennedy's grasp. This president chose a complete unknown to be his Secretary of Energy and, to the amazement of some and consternation of others, she supported the CTBT wholeheartedly. This president also chose a Secretary of Defense who was broad gauged and wise, and who chose not to make the President's life very difficult on this issue. A congressional majority existed in 1993 that wanted to stop testing--glory be. The congress was willing to spend an ungodly amount of money to keep the nuclear labs content without testing. And there were some key people in the executive branch that fought hard for this treaty, over the misgivings of many in the bureaucracy. NGOs here and elsewhere worked their asses off for this treaty. This fortuitous constellation of factors has already changed (witness the Republican Party's takeover of Capitol Hill & presidential platform). If we lose the Treaty now, we may get it again soon--or we may not. I think the Clinton Administration's negotiating end game has left much to be desired. The Administration's eagerness for a CTBT is wonderful, in my view, but it has led people like you, Raja, to conclude that it is all a plot directed at India. It has led other states to up the ante, assuming that the US wants the treaty so bad that it will compromise many times over to get it. Wrong. We may just be losing our best chance to get the CTBT.

michael, this is uday. let me toss a couple of points into the pot. about the utility of nukes - even if the security and utility of nukes is moot, i do no think anyone would disagree if one were to suggest that the presenece or potential presenece of nuclear weapons in a nation's security periphery is cause for considerable insecurity. would you go along with this formulation? and secondly, as a sailor who has had a modest innings with submarines in this part of thw world. i would argue that the SSBN is the ultimate deterrent - which is why not just the US but France and UK are embarked upon very costly modernisation pmmes. and finally, that the presenece of an SSBN a few hundred miles off your coast is a aacase of sovereignty being shrunk.

Raj: You are such a literalist when it comes to reading Pentagon reports. There is a huge gulf between official doctrine and reality regarding the utility of nuclear weapons. The last "converts" to common sense will be the nuclear theologians. Again, this is why the CTBT is so important: all of their theories about utility (political & military) will be undermined by the sustained absence of testing and use.

Uday: You and Adm Menon--IDSA's SSBN lobby! These are quite fearsome machines for weapons of mass destruction. The USN couldn't live without them, and they did serve as a useful deterrent during our paranoid Cold War phases, when some here were obsessed with windows of vulnerability. But SSBNs are hugely expensive. How high a priority should this be in the Indian defense budget?

Mr Krepon, is the CTBT in its present incarnation dead?

Nikhil: You ask about the period of limbo for the CTBT. Until this treaty enters into force, it would serve as a moratorium against testing--one hopes. How long would this moratorium last? This is the key question, since the waiting period for EIF could be quite long. The answer to this all-important question depends largely on the domestic politics in key countries that are most likely to resume testing. I would put Russia and India at the top of this list at present. Depending on the outcome of the US presidential and congressional elections, the US could rank high on this list, as well.

Mr Krepon, I am surprised that you put India and Russia at the top of the states most likely to conduct a nuclear test. Is there any basis for such an observation? Or is just a hunch?

Michael, the present CTBT looks quite dead. where does one go from here? One certainly hopes that NGOs and other concerned people don't give up trying for a treaty that could go a long way in curbing baser human instincts.

To everyone! We had a powerfailure for 2 hours and have been working on an unreliable generator and have had three changes of modem and 2 telephone lines! Hence we could not respond adequately. More ...

Mr Krepon: How do you see the CTBT suceeding under the current circumstances?

Nikhil: I would not say that the CTBT is now dead. I would say that it is hanging in the balance, and with it, the standing of the Conference on Disarmament to execute its mission. Every state at the CD, including India, agreed to the mandate for the CTBT negotiations in January 1994. This mandate called for intensive negotiations on a universal and multilaterrally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty--full stop. Only when this treaty was at last within reach, after forty years of sporadic effort, did India insist on a far different negotiation, linking the CTBT to staged elimination of nukes. How ironic. In the US, we call this "bait and switch" tactics. In pursuing these tactics, India not only jeopardized the CTBT, it also undermines the negotiating body in which it wants to pusue phased disarmament. If the CD's mandate can be highjacked once, it can be highjacked again--this time by the nuclear weapon states.

Achin & Praful: I was just wondering what happened to you garrulous chaps!

praful etc continue ... please read 'seminar 444' and EPW aug 3rd for a more detailed presentation of our arguments for ctbt. We will be glad to communicate with all of you at praful's email address : pbidwai@pb.unv.ernet.in Please feel free to contact us for our book ' testing times'. Thanks. Can't assure of further communication just npow. Will try.

Can anyone answer why India agreed to the mandate of the CTBT in January 1994, knowing quite well then the positions of the US and the rest? Did India then think that the US would come down some way?

Praful, please try and stay on. It is great having you on the Chat. It was good to see you go head to head with K Subrahmanyan on Jairam Ramesh's show. I dunno if you caught it , but CNN carried a clip this morning.

Mr Krepon, do you have any idea what the Clinton administration is doing to persuade India not to block the CTBT?

[praful and achin] to all: the critical question is to get a near consensual agreement on the ctbt, rather than lose the treaty alltogether. If India blocks and the P5 treat the EIF provision in an equally cynical way, that would undermine the CD and make it impossible to negotiate any further restrained measures including a FISSban, which is on the Cd agenda. In that case we can say goodbye to all nuclear restraint measures for a long time to come. Surely, this is not what India with its professed commitemnt to nuclear disarmament wants! One could equally plausibly argue that India wants to scupper the treaty. If so, it has done rather well.

michael, hang on, this is uday. the mandate of the ctbt has a little more. it also talks about "an effectively veriifable ctbt which would contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferatio of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security". the linkage to disarmament ism not as untenable as is being made out in this chat. there are also reservations about how comprehesive the ctbt is. SUBCRITICAL TESTS.! i understand that the weapons labs in the US also believe that new weapons could be designed without explosive testing. these anxieties are not imaginary, especially if you are a non-nuclear state.

Mr Krepon: Once the Treaty is signed. HOW do you plan to dispose the huge amounts of Nuclear arsenal?

to all: this would, of course, be in keeping with the P5 and in particular US [republican] agenda. Anyone who is against nuclear weapons must oppose it as strongly as they opposed P5 intransigence. We have to explore ways of reaching legal agreement on this and other issues! We should try to communicate ways of doing so.

Nikhil: Why put Russia and India at the top of the list of countries that might test? For different reasons. Russia's conventional forces are in bad shape, and the Russian General Staff has, as a consequence, placed greater reliance on nukes to safeguard its national security. I believe this is a dreadful mistake, but it's their call. The Russian nuclear weapons complex remains extremely influential. It is causing all sorts of problems in US-Russian negotiations to promote greater transparency and accountability in nuclear weapon capabilities. Russia hasn't tested for quite some time. It's leadership is clearly in transition. Who can speak with authority on where Russia is heading? (All the more reason for the CTBT). As for India, the arguments used to rally the country against the CTBT--not just to secure all-party opposition to the treaty text, but also to the extraordinary step of blocking its transmission--naturally raises questions elsewhere about India's true intent. The ostensible reasons for adopting such an extreme national position are not very convincing to outsiders, even though they generate widespread support within India. As discussed earlier, by signing the CTBT, India would not forego the nuclear option--so this argument holds no water outside the country. Nor is this a sovereignty issue, as treaty opponents have so cleverly asserted. India would retain the sovereign right not to sign the treaty and not to be under its obligations. The CD Chairman has already publicly announced that the EIF clause should not be interpreted as authorizing multilateral sanctions against India if New Delhi decided not to join. (Although individual countries would retain that sovereign right.) India's linkage of a CTBT to phased disarmament has not received support, even from other countries that want this outcome. Why? Because this formal linkage wouldkill the CTBT--the necessary condition to phased elimination. Thus, India's "principled" position seems rather suspect outside the country's borders. If such weak arguments can gain such credence within India, i

Achin, Praful: Could you log out and log in again? There is a problem in your browser. Many thanks.

Mr Krepon: What if the Indian government decides to go the FRENCH way ? Is there anything that can be done to stop India from going ahead and doing it?

Michael, the last few words of your last answer to Nikhil got cut due to a technical snag. Could you please repeat them.

Mr Krepon: What if the Indian government decides to go the French way? Is there anyway they can be stopped?

[praful] to nikhil: I am distressed at the arguments, apparently technical ones that you have cited, simply because they make no sense. If we want to promote a genuine debate we should not resort to tachnological disinformation about what nonexplosive testing can do. If you want to find out more about this, I would be glad to provide you with a bibliography. I really feel depressed when I see 'technological' arguments masquerading as political excuses for not signing the CTBT. We should discuss this further. Perhaps, in a more literate way. All the best. Praful.

Michael, do you think India is likely to go in for nuclear testing after the Geneva talks. Many in India think it is high time we give up our ambiguity and go nuclear

Mr Krepon: What if the meteroite that is supposed to hit our planet by the year 2001 , starts heading towards us and all the nations have signed the CTBT and disposed off their Nuclear weapons . HOW will we protect Earth???

Praful, I haven't cited any technical reasons, Are you sure that's me you have got out there...

Nikhil: My last transmission got cut off. To continue: If such weak arguments can gain credence within India, Indians might also be persuaded by weak arguments to test and then join the CTBT--despite the considerable damage that would naturally result for stability and development on the subcontinent.

Is there a bug showing up here?

Sunny

Uday: The linkage between the CTBT and nuclear disarmament is as clear as day--which is why we need the CTBT in force. The negotiating mandate for the CTBT clarifies this linkage, without mandating the negotiations India is calling for. The reason is simple: Attempts to negotiate this mandate in 1993-4 would have failed due to the opposition of the US, Russia, GB, and France. Sometimes, an idirect can work, whereas a direct approach will fail. Surely, sophisticated Indian strategists know this, which is why many suspect that their true purpose is to block the CTBT and to pursue the thermonuclear option.

Is Michael Krepon still Live?CAn I ask him a few Questions?

Where are you logged in from?

Dear Niukjhil, I probably tgot confused with something else, but yhe point remains. The Indian objection to the CTBT ahs nothing to do with the nartioanl interest or thre ":universal" argumenrts cited. It is a crude case of preserviung the "option"--itself a questionable prpoposiotion. Warm regards, Prafyl

:-)

Uday: Many of your colleagues have used your argument that the CTBT will not foreclose new US designs of nuclear weapons. This argument is understandable, given the amount of money the US is putting into the stockpile stewardship program, but it is fallacious. Let me explain to you about how the addiction to nuclear weapons works in a NWS. A nuclear weapons lab employs many, many people. They demonsrate their talents by designing a bomb. After they are finished, they justify their existence and demonstrate their talents by designing a "better" bomb. (Imagine the situation that results when there are competing nuclear weapon labs, as in the US). When you are badly addicted, each successive bomb becomes more complex, more sophisticated--so complex and sophisticated that each design requires multiple tests to have confidence in its design yield, reliability and safety. (Why do you think the US has tested over a thoudand times?) Any new, sophisticated design that has not been tested is an unrealiable design. No addicted nuclear weapon establishment will rely on untested, sophisticated designs. At long last, the addiction now reinforces the worth of the CTBT. With a CTBT, there will be no more sophisticated new designs--another reason for the treaty. To my Indian friends: It is time for you to go to sleep and for me to have lunch. I enjoyed our chat, and hope that we can do more of this. Best wishes--Michael Krepon

Mr Krepon, Many thanks for your kindness. We do hope you will appear on our Chat again, to continue this most illuminating discussion. Goodbye.

Mr Krepon, Many thanks for your kindness. We do hope you will appear on our Chat again, to continue this most illuminating discussion. Goodbye.